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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ottoman-Polish Relations in the Sixteenth Century. 
Wawrzyniak, Krzysztof. 
M.A., Department of History. 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel. 
 
 
 
 
The Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania remained direct neighbors from the late 
Middle Ages until the end of eighteenth century. Long coexistence of both states led 
to development of rich and diverse forms of contacts on various levels. The sixteenth 
century was marked by both continuity and change in the bilateral contacts. The 
overall peaceful political and diplomatic cooperation during the reign of the last 
Jagiellonians evolved into active competition by the end of the sixteenth century. 
The Ottoman statesmen tried to influence results of first royal elections and to secure 
continuity of the balance of power in Central Europe. This policy became most 
successful during the reign of Stephan Bathory. The reign of Bathory’s successor, 
Sigismund III Vasa became a step towards a century of military conflicts between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Unlike the political 
relations, trade and other economic activities remained stable. 
 The thesis will present a critical approach towards existing historiography as 
such and it will reexamine major questions concerning the Ottoman-Polish relations 
in the sixteenth century. The Ottoman attempts to influence the royal elections in 
Poland-Lithuania and the border activities of the Cossacks, the Tatars and the border 
lords will be analyzed, in order to verify whether they influenced the deterioration of 
bilateral political and diplomatic issues. Practical dimensions of everyday Ottoman-
Polish contacts together with analysis of major reasons of changes in relations will 
be the focal point of this study. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Leh İlişkileri. 
Wawrzyniak, Krzysztof. 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü. 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Oktay Özel. 
 
 
 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Ortaçağın son dönemlerinden onsekizinci yüzyıla kadar, 
Lehistan ile komşuydu. Bu uzun dönem boyunca, iki devlet arasında, çeşitli 
düzeylerde yoğun bir alışveriş yaşandı. Onaltıncı yüzyıl, bu ilişkinin hem değişimi 
hem de sürekliliği açısından önemli bir yüzyıldır. Bu yüzyılda, son Jagiellonianların 
dönemindeki barışçı politik ve diplomatik atmosfer yerini aktif bir rekabete bıraktı. 
Osmanlı devletadamları, ilk kraliyet seçimlerinin sonucunu etkilemeye ve Orta 
Avrupa’daki güç dengelerini korumaya çalıştılar. Bu politika, özellikle Stephan 
Bathory’nin döneminde (1576-1586) başarılı olmuştu. Ancak, Bathory’den sonra 
gelen III. Sigismund Vasa döneminde (1587-1632) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile 
Lehistan-Litvanya Birliği arasında bir yüzyıl süren askeri uyuşmazlıklar başgösterdi. 
Politik ilişkilerin tersine, ticaret ve diğer ekonomik faaliyetlerde bir değişim 
görülmedi. 
 
Bu tez, konuyla ilgili olarak yazılmış tarihi eserleri eleştirel bir açıdan incelemekte 
ve onaltıncı yüzyıl Osmanlı-Lehistan ilişkileriyle ilgili önemli soruları yeniden ele 
almaktadır. Osmanlıların, Lehistan kraliyet seçimlerini etkileme çabaları, 
Kazakların, Tatarların ve sınır boylarında soyluların sınırlardaki faaliyetleri 
incelenmiş, bunların politik ve diplomatik ilişkilerin kötüleşmesinde oynadıkları rolü 
tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Osmanlı-Lehistan ilişkilerinin gündelik hayattaki 
boyutları ve geçirdiği değişimler bu çalışmanın esas konusunu teşkil etmektedir. 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Lehistan, Litvanya, Diplomasi, Ticaret 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I. Subject and Sources 
 
Despite the fact that Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire shared important 
political, economic and military interest, and the scale of bilateral contacts was 
immense for several centuries, the topic has been researched to much smaller degree 
than it deserves. Especially, the sixteenth century is still much neglected. Moreover, 
apparently none of Turkish historians has ever used Polish archives, whereas the 
only Polish historian who has ever used the Ottoman archive in Istanbul on a regular 
basis is Dariusz Kołodziejczyk. Surprisingly, major difficulty of this kind of 
research is not the linguistic side, because many Ottoman documents preserved in 
Polish archives were already published and analyzed well before the Second World 
War by such famous orientalists as Jan Reychman and Ananiasz Zajączkowski. One 
would suspect that difficult access to the archives in Istanbul until recent years and 
totalitarian political system in Poland until 1989 were major obstacles in the 
development of research and closer collaboration of historians in this field. 
There exists only several general works dealing with Polish-Ottoman issues. 
In Turkish historiography, the classical work Osmanlı Tarihi by İsmail Hakkı 
 2 
Uzunçarşılı is practically the only study that covers the whole period of Ottoman-
Polish contacts until the partitions of Poland-Lithuania by the end of the 18th 
century. Major advantage of Uzunçarşılı’s work is the author’s attempt to present 
chronological development of events between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman 
State with taking into consideration the role of neighboring and vassal states and 
general political context of a given period. The study focuses mostly on political 
aspects of relations and no other spheres of contacts were introduced. Despite the 
fact that Uzunçarşılı did not have access to European sources and publications, 
which is one of major disadvantages of his study, his book is a perfect reference 
work, and the amount of Ottoman works consulted is very impressive. İsmail Hami 
Danişmend’s İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi is also a valuable and in many cases 
indispensable reference work in which Ottoman political and social events are 
presented chronologically. Another important, although somewhat old-fashioned 
work is Joseph von Hammer’s Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs, in which Polish-
Lithuanian issues are presented quite often. Historia Turcji [History of Turkey] by 
Reychman also covers the entire Ottoman history, but it does not deal specifically 
with Ottoman-Polish relations; development of events is presented according to 
Marxist methodology and many aspects are already out of date. The same could be 
said about Historia dyplomacji polskiej [History of Polish Diplomacy]. This 
monumental work focuses on development of diplomatic relations and political 
priorities of all Polish state formations, from the Piast principality and kingdom, 
through the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, until modern times. Relations with 
the Ottomans are given a lot of attention, but the book was prepared rather carelessly 
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and there are some important errors.1 Major advantage of the book, is the extremely 
rich set of European primary sources consulted; one should perhaps use it as a kind 
of archival guidebook. A popular book by Pajewski Buńczuk i koncerz. Z dziejów 
wojen polsko-tureckich [From the History of Polish –Turkish Wars] is valuable for 
military conflicts of the seventeenth century, but it treats earlier events very briefly. Its most 
interesting aspect is a number of detailed descriptions of battles, based upon contemporary 
primary sources. Since this study is written in a “crusading” manner, it should be 
approached critically by those dealing with seventeenth century Ottoman-Polish wars. 
Halil İnalcık’s The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600 remains 
one of the most important works dealing with the 16th century Ottoman-foreign 
relations in general. The author analyzes the role of Poland-Lithuania in a less 
detailed way than Uzunçarşılı, but puts it into broader socio-economic and political 
perspective, presenting the Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the Ottoman policies 
towards the European neighbors of the Ottoman Empire as a search for balance of 
power. This idea is discussed further in relevant chapters. Halil İnalcık’s most recent 
work A Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire also provides important 
details on the relations between the Porte and Poland-Lithuania, predominantly 
about their economic dimension. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk follows İnalcık’s ideas in 
Ottoman-Polish Relations, where he tries to correlate diplomatic relations between 
the two states, from the beginning until the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, with the 
development of ‘ahidname. Kołodziejczyk used sources from many different 
archives, including the Ottoman archive in Istanbul but he focused predominantly on 
                                                 
1 For example, the authors claim the Ottoman documents sent to Poland were written in Arabic, 
which of course is a serious mistake (Vol. I, p. 765). 
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‘ahidnames and used other sources, like relevant mühimme registers, very scarcely. 
The only sixteenth-century registers used by Kołodziejczyk are the mühimmes 
number 7, 31, 68 and 69. In addition, Kołodziejczyk focuses mostly on the political 
and theoretical mechanisms of diplomatic relations and does not discuss practical 
functioning of diplomatic issues in everyday contacts. Since full texts and the 
transcriptions of almost all ‘ahidnames granted to the Polish kings are given, the 
work is one of the most valuable critical source editions for research of bilateral 
contacts. Short study of relations between the two states can also be found in İslâm 
Asnsiklopedisi and the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the latter having Poland as a 
separate item. However, sixteenth century was not given sufficient attention. 
Existing general works reshaped numerous theories concerning the long-
lasting Polish-Ottoman neighborhood, but there is still need for research, which 
would utilize sources from both sides on the one hand and be general in content on 
the other. However, it seems that without a number of articles and books concerning 
specific topics preparation of more general comparative and analytical works would 
be a difficult task, mostly due to extensive primary sources. Specific works focused 
on detailed issues are quite numerous, but majority of them is devoted to Polish-
Ottoman military history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, in 
most cases the aforementioned source limitation narrows potential comparative 
perspective. The present study is limited to the 16th century and therefore research 
devoted to other periods is not presented. Very rich bibliography of existing works 
on the topic can be found in Kołodziejczyk’s Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations 
and in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (the former is much more detailed and up to date). 
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Contacts between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth 
century have been so far researched unsystematically, the studies being mainly 
focused on single political problems, and therefore lacking broader perspective. 
Polish historians have been interested in the attitude of sixteenth century Polish 
nobility towards the Ottomans and projects of political or military alliances between 
Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. In 1900 Franciszek Bujak published an 
article “Kalimach i znajomość państwa tureckiego w Polsce około początku XVI w.” 
[Calimachus and the Knowledge of the Turkish State in Poland at the Beginning of 
16th Century]. In the article, the author proves that the Polish and Lithuanian gentry 
expressed profound interest in the Ottoman State and their knowledge was based on 
and shaped by the works of Kalimach, or Constantine of Ostrovica, the well-known 
author of renowned Memoirs of Jannisary. Constantine wrote his memoirs in Polish 
and since there exist several different manuscripts of this work, soon after the 
Bujak’s article a critical edition of Memoirs of Jannisary was published by Jan Łoś. 
Constantine wrote his Memoirs as a kind of guide in which the author explains how 
to combat the Ottomans and calls for united military action of Christendom. Soon 
after publication of this book, a debate started among Polish historians, who wanted 
to discover what was the real attitude of Polish kings toward the Ottomans. Three 
important articles on the topic were published by Janusz Pajewski: “Turcja wobec 
elekcji Walezego” [“Turkey and the Election of Henry de Valois”] (1933), “Turcja 
wobec elekcji Batorego” [“Turkey and the Election of Bathory”] (1935), and 
“Projekt przymierza polsko-tureckiego za Zygmunta Augusta” [“Project of Polish-
Turkish Covenant at the Time of Sigismund Augustus”]. The author discovered that 
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there was a serious attempt to establish Polish-Ottoman military coalition against 
Muscovy in 1565 and then in 1569. According to Pajewski, the first project initiated 
by the Polish king, and the second one, supported by the sultan, were very seriously 
influenced by the policy of the Crimean khan Devlet Giray. Despite the fact that 
Muscovy was a common enemy of all three states, Crimean Tatars were afraid of 
their own future in case the Ottomans and Poland-Lithuania would gain too much 
power. The article stresses the important role of the Tatars in influencing foreign 
policy of their neighbors. The Tatar problem is an interesting one and has also been 
studied by Halil İnalcık in “Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı 
Teşebbüsü (1569)”, “The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate 
under Sahib Giray I”, “Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tâbiliğine 
Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi”, where the author has tried to determine what role 
the Crimean khanate played in the power struggle among its neighbors, being at the 
same time the vassal state of the Porte. Leszek Podhorodecki in his impressive 
monograph Chanat Krymski i jego stosunki z Polską w XV-XVIII w. [The Crimean 
Khanate and its Relations with Poland in 15th-18th Centuries] presents the khanate from the 
perspective of Polish interest. The author followed the idea of two simultaneous internal 
tendencies that shaped the political thought of the Girays, i.e. on the one hand a very strong 
inclination towards independent policy and keeping the balance of power in the region and 
on the other keeping good relations (without excluding temporary tensions) with the 
Ottoman State. 
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The question of the Ottoman influence on first Polish royal elections after childless 
death of Sigismund Augustus in 1572 has been a subject of several articles.2 The idea of 
considerable Ottoman influence on Poland was proposed by Ahmet Refik in the article 
“Lehistan’da Türk Hâkimiyeti” and developed in the book Sokollu by the same author. The 
question of first two royal elections was also discussed by Pajewski in two articles “Turcja 
wobec elekcji Walezego” [“Turkey and the Election of Valois”] and “Turcja wobec elekcji 
Batorego” [“Turkey and the Election of Bathory”]. The author supported the idea that in 
both cases the influence of the Ottomans on the result of the election was mostly 
psychological, i.e. the electors were afraid to support a candidate from such a country, which 
was the enemy of the Ottomans (the Habsburgs or the Muscovites). Different approach is 
presented by R. Nisbet Bain, who in the article “The Polish Interregnum, 1575” proposed 
very detailed analysis of events during the elections in Poland and on Ottoman borderland. 
According to Bain, the Ottomans were actively preparing military action in case the election 
would finish against their political interest. Bain’s article is older, but Pajewski did not use 
it. Instead, he based his study on various archival documents and the French diplomatic 
reports, published by Charrière in Les négociations de la France dans le Levant (1853). This 
topic, as one of major parts of this work, is discussed further in the second chapter. 
Economic activities between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire are 
portrayed by Andrzej Dziubiński in a very valuable and detailed monograph Na 
szlakach orientu. Handel między Polską a Imperium Osmańskim w XVI-XVIII wieku 
[On the Routes of Orient. Trade Between Poland and the Ottoman Empire in 16th-
18th Century]. This monograph is the most serious work devoted to this topic but, 
despite its impressive content and numerous sources used, it has weak points. The 
                                                 
2 There also exists a monograph on the topic, but I have found it out after writing this study: Beydilli, 
K. Die Polnischen Königswahlen und Interregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte osmanischer 
Archivalien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der osmanischen Machtspolitik.  Munich, 1976. 
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most important one is the fact that the author is unacquainted with major 
contemporary works on the topic published in Turkish and English. Especially lack 
of references to the research by İnalcık, Faroqhi, Fleet or Fisher (just to mention the 
most important ones), and to relevant published sources, comprises major 
disadvantage of the work. Various paragraphs and chapters dealing with the topic in 
books and articles by İnalcık, who treats trade with Poland as a part of the entire 
economic system of the Ottoman State, are another very important contribution to 
the research of the Polish-Ottoman trade. Among Halil İnalcık’s works, most 
attention to the issue is given in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 
Empire and in Osmanlı İmparatorluğu. Toplum ve Ekonomi. İnalcık’s works are 
based mainly upon Ottoman sources with the use of secondary literature on the 
subject. Despite the existence of several works on Polish-Ottoman trade, there are 
still many sources, which were never researched.3 
As one may observe, although many elements of the Ottoman-Polish reality 
have been researched, many fields have been neglected. Analysis of the whole 
sixteenth century is too broad a topic and therefore major stress of the present study 
is limited to certain aspects of Polish-Ottoman contacts in the second part of the 
sixteenth century. Time frames are determined in order to present how the quality 
and quantity of contacts between the two states changed during the transition period 
when the Polish-Lithuanian State transformed from the hereditary kingdom with the 
capital in Kraków, into the Polish-Lithuanian elective and decentralized monarchy, 
                                                 
3 Dziubiński mentions rich collection of Armenian legal documents from 16th and 17th centuries 
written in Polish or Kipchak but in Armenian alphabet. The collection is preserved in the city archive 
in Lwów and only one defter has been so far read and used. The documents often concern Ottoman 
trade. 
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ruled by the king and the diet from Warsaw. Because the Ottoman Empire also 
entered a period of decentralization and internal revolts after the death of Suleyman 
the Magnificent in 1566, the balance of power between the two states was affected 
and both states shifted towards a series of wars in the seventeenth centuries. 
This work analyzes how internal changes in Poland-Lithuania influenced the 
attitude of the Ottoman State. The basic set of primary sources consulted consists of 
relevant records from the mühimme records and various letters from the sultans, 
viziers or vassal lords (e.g. the Moldavian voivodes) sent to Polish kings and lords. 
Apart from this, several other sources, like relations of Polish envoys from their 
missions to Istanbul and letters of the sultan’s translator Ibrahim Bey (Strasz) to king 
Sigismund Augustus are used. Published Ottoman chronicles are also consulted, 
although they include relatively limited material concerning Poland-Lithuania. 
Majority of source material has not been published before. Because the number of 
the available sources for the period is quite extent, it was impossible to consult all of 
them due to limitations of this work. The sources have been nevertheless selected 
carefully in order to present a broad spectrum of topics and issues. In the second 
chapter of this work, political relations between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman 
Empire are presented from the perspective of the balance of power between the two 
states. Therefore, problems of cooperation in Transylvanian, Moldavian and 
Muscovite issues during the reign of Sigismund Augustus are discussed. In addition 
to the controversial problem of the Ottoman influence on Polish royal elections and 
the question of Ottoman attempts to control politically Poland-Lithuania, analysis of 
major reasons of changes in relations at the end of the sixteenth century constitutes 
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the last part of the second chapter. The third chapter is devoted to practical side of 
relations. In other words, everyday functioning of diplomacy and specific problems 
the official of both states had to face in bilateral contact are formulated. This chapter 
also focuses on the role the borderland played in Ottoman-Polish contacts. The 
important positions of the Cossacks, the Tatars and the Danubian principalities in 
shaping Ottoman and Polish-Lithuanian political attitudes are dealt with in certain 
details. During the entire sixteenth and seventeenth centuries economic relations and 
trade played indispensable role for both states and therefore analysis of this 
phenomenon is the last topic of the last chapter. 
 
 
II. Poland-Lithuania during the Early Modern Period: An Overview of Socio-
political Conditions 
 
The traditional name of the country in Polish, Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka (The 
Republic of Nobles) gives a general idea about the kind of country the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was. One may ask what determined the particular role 
the nobility played. The answer to this question is connected with the Statue of 
Košice4 issued by King Louis of Anjou in 1374 in order to secure the Polish throne 
for his daughter Jadwiga by granting land-tax exemption and reduction of the 
taxation rate levied on nobility.5 Jadwiga’s premature death forced Jadwiga’s 
                                                 
4 Today Košice is a major city in eastern Slovakia. 
5 Davies, N.  God’s Playground. A History of Poland.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1982: 
vol. I, p. 211. 
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husband, king Jagiello to introduce several new privileges for the nobility in order to 
secure the throne for his sons. 
Theoretically, the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy had become elective even 
before the rise of the Jagiellonians, when Casimir the Great, the last king of the Piast 
dynasty died in 1370, but as long as the Jagiellonians ruled, nobody was thinking of 
free royal election seriously.6 Nevertheless, the dynasty had problems with the 
succession, and the following Jagiellonian kings had to introduce a series of 
legislative acts changing the legal status of the gentry in their realm, for example the 
rule forbidding the king from imposing new taxes and raising army without the 
consent of the local diets and Nihil Novi – a regulation passed in 1505, prohibiting 
the introduction of any new laws without the agreement of the diet7 and the senate. 
When Sigismund the Old and his wife queen Bona Sforza forced the diet and the 
senate to crown their son Sigismund II Augustus during their lifetime in 1529, it 
caused a wave of protests and was seen as an exception from the custom.8 The death 
of Sigismund II in 1548 brought a period of interregnum and struggles among 
factions on the one hand and concepts of total legal equality among the gentry on the 
other. Legal changes introduced during the reign of the Jagiellonian kings were 
designed not in order to weaken the king’s authority, but in order to keep the balance 
                                                 
6 Mączak, Antoni.  “The structure of power in the Commonwealth of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.”  A Republic of Nobles. ed. J. K. Fedorowicz.  Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982: p. 
109. 
7 Polish diet, the Sejm was an assembly of all the gentry, whereas the senate played role of advisory 
body to the king. The members of the senate were esteemed and powerful lords, the magnates and 
important hierarchs of the Catholic Church. Both the diet and the senate were very influential in 
legislative process and gradually limited power of the king. 
8 Historia Polski.  ed. Stefan Kieniewicz & Witold Kula.  Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, 1958: vol I part 2 (15th century-1764)., p. 220, Mączak, Antoni.  Money, Prices and 
Power in Poland, 16-17th Centuries.  Aldershot: Variorum, 1995: p. 109. 
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in a triangle: the king – the magnates – the gentry.9 The magnates tried to obtain 
privileges from the king and to secure their power. The Jagiellonians were aware of 
this phenomenon and tried to gain advantage for their own position.10 After 
Sigismund II’s death, the balance between the three elements was destroyed because 
of the Henrician articles11 signed by the first elected king Henry de Valois. The role 
of the kings gradually diminished and soon “the king of the Republic was appointed 
as a lifelong manager, working on contract to the rules of the firm. From coronation 
to the grave, he could have no illusions but that he was the servant, and the nobility 
his master.”12 Henry’s flight after death of his brother Charles IX further diminished 
the status of king and the magnates soon started taking control over the situation. 
The great differences in financial status among magnates and the bulk of the gentry 
created a system of financial support in return for political loyalty in the local diet.13 
The role of the magnates in the royal court also increased. Besides, the so-called 
senators-resident controlled king’s activities between meetings of the diet. 
Furthermore, almost all higher administrative positions of considerable importance 
(e.g. hetman or chancellor) became lifetime tenure, giving their holders an 
opportunity to carry out independent politics.14 Growth of the privileges of the 
gentry, and especially of the magnates led to limitations for all other groups but the 
Catholic Church, which kept influential political position, particularly in the 
                                                 
9 Wyczański, Andrzej.  “The problem of authority in sixteenth-century Poland: an essay in 
reinterpretation”.  A Republic of Nobles, p. 96. 
10 Historia Polski.  vol. I, p. 212. 
11 The articles were a series of rules each elected king had to accept in order to be crowned. With 
time, new regulations were added, thus further limiting the king’s power. 
12 Davies.  God’s Playground, pp. 334-35. 
13 Mączak.  “The Structure of Power”, p. 125. 
14 Historia Polski.  vol. I, p. 556. 
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senate.15 The hierarchs of the Church were often the members of the gentry and 
therefore, it would be difficult to separate them. 
One of distinctive features of the socio-political system of Poland-Lithuania 
was the lack of townsmen in political life and the constant financial troubles of the 
Jagiellonians. These two factors can be linked, because the Jagiellonians did not 
manage to build an effective administrative structure that would help them gain the 
support of the town dwellers.16 At the end of the fifteenth century, there were some 
600 urban centers in Poland-Lithuania. This number looks impressive but taking into 
consideration that only five or six of them exceeded or approached 10,000 
inhabitants (not citizens), it becomes clear that Poland was in fact a typical 
agricultural state. The greatest cities were Gdańsk-Danzig (30,000), Kraków 
(18,000) and Lwów, Toruń-Thorn and Elbląg (all of them c. 8,000 inhabitants). By 
the end of the sixteenth century, there were already around 900 towns, but only eight 
of them were inhabited by more than 10,000 people. Moreover, Polish-Lithuanian 
towns were divided into two categories: royal and private. In the late seventeenth 
century, only 35 percent of the towns belonged to the first category. The royal towns 
were usually located upon German law and the inhabitants were granted far going 
autonomy and numerous privileges. This was not the case in the private towns, 
where the inhabitants were fully dependent on the owner – usually a magnate, a 
wealthy clergyman or a religious institution. The owner was able to dictate the rules 
and laws for the city dwellers. Growth of private towns influenced considerably the 
character of Polish urban development. Apart from that, limited citizen rights were 
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another factor weakening the structure of towns. Usually only the Catholics were 
granted such right, whereas in some towns other religious groups formed the 
majority of inhabitants. In the late sixteenth century, only 60 percent (or less) of 
urban population possessed citizenship. From this number only a few percent were 
property holders, because most of urban property passed into the Church or hands of 
the magnates in that period. Ordinary citizens held only around 28 percent of urban 
property in the end of the sixteenth century and the number was still decreasing.17 
Political situation of the towns reflected their development. After John Albert 
had granted the gentry monopoly of land holding in 1496, wealthy town dwellers 
gradually lost potential influence. In 1501 and 1507, the gentry obtained a new tool 
to weaken the town development – this was an exemption from custom duties on 
commodities exported from their demesnes and on all items imported for personal 
use. At the same time merchants had to pay 6 percent on imports, 8 percent on 
exports and 2 percent on internal transactions. 18 In 1507 and 1538, foreign 
merchants were allowed both wholesale and retail at Polish markets and in 1538 and 
1552 the gentry tried to abolish the guilds. Later on, a monopoly was granted for the 
gentry over the export route along the Vistula River.19 The situation did not satisfy 
the gentry and in 1565, prohibition on export of anything other than cattle or oxen 
was imposed on the townsmen. 
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Situation of the Jews was to some extent better. Although they were not 
allowed to become the gentry unless they had converted, the Jews played an 
important role in contacts between the gentry and other social groups, acting as trade 
agents or moneylenders. Wealth gained by such activities allowed the Jews to avoid 
some prohibitions – some of them wore swords, or even entered the gentry. 
However, in general their political influence was rather limited.20 
Having analyzed the relations between the gentry and the urban population it 
is possible to focus on the majority of the dwellers of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth – the peasants, who in 1569 constituted about sixty percent of 
population, most of them being serfs. It is not easy to analyze the status of peasants 
because the line between a free and an unfree person was very thin. Free 
communities had no legal means of defending themselves if the local landholder 
wanted to remove their freedom. Sometimes the peasants ran away and were offered 
free status by another landholder. The gentry usually did not try to capture the 
runaways, because the cost of such an enterprise was very high.21 Peasants were 
usually fleeing into near villages, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth century a 
general tendency arose to runaway into distant Ukrainian lands, and join the 
Cossacks, who with time became one of the most influential elements of Ottoman-
Polish relations. The Cossacks were originally Tatar mercenaries garrisoned in forts 
on the right bank of the Dnieper River by Witold, the Grand Duke of Lithuania in 
the early fifteenth century. Soon however, the mercenary communities attracted not 
only run-away peasants, but also various outlaws, which resulted in grow of 
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uncontrollable paramilitary bandit groups.22 
As far as religion is concerned, the Polish-Lithuanian State was extremely 
diverse. The largest group were the Roman Catholics, constituting around 45 % of 
the population. The second biggest group (c. 35 % of population) were the 
Orthodox. Various Protestant groups (Lutherans, Calvinists, Arians, Czech Brethren 
and others) also constituted about 20 % of the population. The last important group 
(15 % of the population) were the Jews. The remaining 5 % included the Muslim 
Tatars in Lithuania and the Armenians.23 Despite the fact that the figures are only 
approximate, it is evident that Poland-Lithuania was by no means a Catholic state. 
It seems important to stress certain similarities between Poland-Lithuania and 
the Ottoman State in social and religious strata. Both states were multi-religious and 
multi-national structures, ruled by extended military class, which did not involve in 
direct economic activities. The rights of the city dwellers and peasants were limited 
in similar ways. Apparently, political power of Polish kings seems weaker in 
comparison to the Ottoman sultans but in practice, neither the Jagiellonian with early 
elective kings were quite powerless, nor the Ottoman sultans were almighty. In 
addition, both states had to face long-lasting military campaigns in the sixteenth 
century, which led to serious financial problems. In the end, gradual decentralization 
in both states led to the rise of strong local centers of power (ayans in the Ottoman 
Empire and magnates24 in the Commonwealth). All of these similarities not only 
influenced Ottoman-Polish contacts, but they also can partially explain internal 
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factors, which influenced development of Ottoman-Polish contacts in time. 
 
 
III. The Ottoman-Polish Encounter: The Initial Contacts  
 
Looking at a contemporary map, one could be surprised how such relatively distant 
countries like Poland and Turkey went through a long period of a specific kind of 
contacts, sometimes friendly and sometimes aggressive, but always very vivid, 
which only very close neighbors have. To fully understand both the scale and 
importance of the relations in the second half of the sixteenth century, it is necessary 
to go back in time to the late fourteenth century and review the development of the 
Polish kingdom, the Ottoman conquests in Europe and then the first contacts 
between Poland and the Ottoman State, long before the first became the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth and the latter was rightfully called the Ottoman Empire. 
 On 5 November 1370 Casimir the Great, the last king of the Piast dynasty 
which ruled the Polish kingdom, whether united or split since the conversion of its 
founder, pagan prince Mieszko I to Christianity in 966, died. The king’s death 
created a new political situation as the throne, according to the agreement, was 
inherited by his nephew25, Hungarian king Louis of Anjou.26 Thus, the kingdoms of 
Hungary and Poland entered a phase of personal union, which changed the political 
perspective and ambitions of both states. Through the union, Poland became 
neighbor of kingdoms of Bosnia and Serbia and the Principality of Wallachia, in 
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addition to the principality of Moldavia in the South East, some of these lands being 
under nominal suzerainty of Louis. What is also important, Polish and Hungarian 
territories constituted the eastern border of the Roman Christianity, with pagan 
Lithuania, Orthodox Ruthenia and Muslim Tatar khanate beyond the eastern 
frontiers and the state of warlike Teutonic knights in the north. When the King of 
Bulgaria and the Despot of Dobrudja became Ottoman vassals in 1372,27 the 
Ottoman State and the Polish kingdom were only a step from becoming direct 
neighbors. 
 Lithuania was another important and interesting element on the political map 
of Europe at that time: 
The Lithuanians prided themselves on being the last pagan people in Europe. 
In the thirteenth century, when all their Baltic neighbours – the Prussians 
and Sudovians to the south, and the Letts, Finns and Estonians to the north – 
had been converted to Christianity, they still resisted. [...] By the 1370s when 
Louis of Anjou reigned in Poland and Hungary, Lithuania already rivalled 
the Angevin empire. It was ruled from the ancient capital of Vilnius in the 
north, and dominated by a pagan warrior elite [...]. Its inhabitants were 
largely East Slavs, devoted to the Orthodox faith. Its language was ruski or 
Ruthenian – in a form which is now known as ‘Old Byelorussian’.28 
 
 
Paradoxically the fate of pagan Lithuania became connected with the kingdom of 
Poland for several centuries. When Louis died in 1382 Polish lords were against a 
new personal union with Hungary, as the late king’s elder daughter, although 
obtained the Hungarian crown, was engaged to Sigismund de Luxembourg, which 
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was contrary to Polish political aspirations.29 On the other hand, Louis’s second 
daughter Jadwiga had been engaged to Wilhelm of Habsburg, Prince of Austria and 
the idea of alliance with the Habsburgs was popular only among some nobles. The 
majority was against as this would certainly lead to loss of independence of the state. 
Unexpected solution was found in Lithuania, which pagan prince Jogaila was aware 
that his last pagan country in Europe would become a precious prey for the state of 
the Teutonic Knight in the north. Having obtained the license from the pope to 
convert the Lithuanians, it was only a question of time to conquer this land. 
Consequently, practical calculations offered the only reasonable solution, which was 
tempting for both sides – marriage of Jadwiga and Jogaila and personal union with 
Lithuania. Both states would in this fashion consolidate power against the common 
enemy i.e. the Teutonic State. In 1386 Jogaila was baptized and elected the new king 
of Poland, known since that time as Ladislaus Jagiello.30 
 Since the personal union in 1385, the two states followed a long path 
towards the constitutional union in 1569, which once again changed the political 
perspective of the new Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. In the new situation, the 
Jagiello’s realm bordered states, which would play crucial role in the development 
of policies towards the Ottomans, i.e. the kingdom of Hungary and principality of 
Moldavia in the south, the Tatar khanate in the southeast and the principality of 
Muscovy in the east. In 1387, the king, with the help of his cousin Witold, the Grand 
Duke of Lithuania, took control over the Red Ruthenia (parts of contemporary 
Ukraine), which had been earlier captured by Hungarians. This brought stronger 
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Polish influences in Moldavia and, although not as strong, in Wallachia. Both 
principalities would play crucial role in contacts with the Ottomans in the following 
centuries. To understand fully why control of these places was so important for both 
Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire one should consult the map. It is easy to 
observe that the port cities of Kilia, Akkerman (called in Polish sources Białogród, 
which means “the white city”) and the delta of the Danube River gave control over 
trade in that region and perfect access to the Black Sea, in addition to military 
supremacy. The fact that Hungarians, Poles and the Ottomans wanted to keep their 
influences in the Danubian principalities is important for future development of 
issues among these states. Quite reasonably, both Wallachia and Moldavia can be 
seen as a buffer zone between the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom and the Ottoman 
Empire and remained so up to the end of seventeenth century. 
Witold had political ambitions of his own, and followed a policy of stronger 
independence from his royal cousin. He partially succeeded and practically became 
an independent ruler in Lithuania, but after his death in 1413, the Polish and 
Lithuanian lords achieved an agreement. Accordingly, both states were equal and 
had common foreign policy and ruler. Only with time the two parts of the realm 
assimilated more thoroughly.31 This should not be surprising, because the two units 
followed different political traditions. Polish kingdom was divided into numerous 
principalities for a long period, which led to development of strong lords having 
considerable influence on the king, while Lithuania followed a model, which 
favored strong power of the grand duke. 
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 Hungarian king, and later the emperor, Sigismund tried to find support of the 
Teutonic knights, in order to destroy the newly formed Polish-Lithuanian kingdom, 
because Jagiello was seen by him as a potential candidate to the Hungarian throne. 
In addition, strong Polish-Lithuanian state would undermine Sigismund’s own 
political ambitions. Actually, when Sigismund’s wife Mary died in 1395 Jadwiga 
had pretensions to the Hungarian throne, as an heiress of Louis. However, most 
important area of competition between Poland and Hungary were political influences 
in the Red Ruthenia, Moldavia and Wallachia. Control over these places was 
important for both sides for economic and military reasons, which had already been 
mentioned. Cooperation of Sigismund with the Teutonic order in Prussia against 
Poland weakened in 1397, after the defeat of Hungarian forces at the battle of 
Nicopolis by the Ottomans. The trouble between the two rulers lasted until the treaty 
of Lubowla, signed in 1412. Subjects on both sides were supporting the idea of 
cooperation rather than competition as strong personal and social ties were present 
among them. According to the treaty, Moldavia and Red Ruthenia stayed under 
Polish rule until death of both Sigismund and Jagiello, respectively in 1434 and 
1437. What is important, Hungary on the one side, and Poland together with 
Lithuania on the other, agreed for permanent peace and cooperation against common 
enemies, especially the Ottomans.32 
 Quite contrary to the treaty, Jagiello did not hurry to support anti-Ottoman 
activities of the Hungarian king. Polish knights were taking part in Sigismund’s 
campaigns, but on the private basis. Such a policy seems rational, because Jagiello 
was more concerned with securing northern borders and lands of Lithuania from the 
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Teutonic knights. In 1411, Jagiello and Witold initiated official diplomatic contacts 
with the Ottoman sultans. This was used by the grand master of the Teutonic order 
to accuse the Jagiellonians of preparing plans against the Christendom, together with 
the “pagans”.33 The fact that direct contacts with the Ottomans started so late could 
perhaps be explained by internal issues in both states, i.e., according to 
Kołodziejczyk: 
 
Direct Polish-Ottoman relations were initiated after the delay caused by the 
battle of Ankara (1402) on the one hand and the battle of Grunwald-
Tannenberg (1410) on the other. After 1410, the danger posed by the 
Teutonic order to Poland-Lithuania was removed, and the Ottomans 
managed to overcome the crisis caused by the invasion of Tamerlane.34 
 
 
First real meeting of the Poles and the Ottomans was probably earlier, as some 
Polish knights took part in the battle at the Kosovo field in 1389.35 In 1393 Bayezid 
invaded Wallachia and waged war against its ruler Mircea the Old (1388-1418). 
Since that time the Ottoman sultans considered Wallachia their vassal territory. 
Mircea was replaced by Vlad, who recognized the suzerainty of the sultan and 
started paying tribute in 1394.36 Nevertheless, Mircea continued his struggle against 
the Ottomans together with Venice and Byzantium so eagerly that in 1416 the newly 
united Ottoman state was in considerable danger. According to İnalcık, Christian 
forces were using Mehmed’s brother Mustafa, who launched a revolt in Rumelia in 
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1416, while the Venetian fleet attacked and destroyed the Ottoman fleet at 
Gallipoli.37 This resembles situation in Poland-Lithuania, where Sigismund and the 
Teutonic knights were trying to use Witold for their own purposes and thus weaken 
the position of Jagiello. 
When king Sigismund of Hungary felt the direct threat from the Ottomans, 
he asked Jagiello and Witold for help. The rulers did not want to offer military 
support, but instead in 1414 the Polish king sent two royal envoys: Skarbek of Góra 
and Gregory the Armenian to Mehmed Çelebi, who at that time resided in Bursa.38 
This event can be considered the official establishment of contacts between the two 
states. The envoys succeeded in their mission, obtaining six-year truce from the 
sultan, which was spoiled by a certain Hungarian magnate.39 According to the old 
Polish chronicle, written in the second part of the fifteenth century by Jan Długosz, 
the envoys were received warmly by the sultan. Because the chronicler’s description 
is quite vivid and detailed, it seems proper to present it “as it is”: 
 
King Władysław, who is genuinely sorry for the Hungarians and wants to 
remove the threat hanging over them, sends two of his knights, Skarbek of 
Góra and Gregory the Armenian, to the Sultan, demanding that he stop his 
invasion of Hungary, release all his prisoners and conclude a truce for six 
years, otherwise the King will attack the Sultan with all his forces. The 
Sultan receives the two envoys graciously and generously provides them with 
everything they need. He invited them to several banquets and finally 
promises to end hostilities and conclude a six-year truce with Hungary. To 
add weight to his promise, he agrees to send his own envoys to Hungary. 
Skarbek travels through Wallachia and returns safely to Poland to report to 
Władysław; however, the Turks hesitate to set out without a written safe-
conduct, so Gregory goes ahead to arrange for one, but when he applies for 
it to the Ban of Temessna, he is thought to be a spy and put in prison, where 
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his goods, clothes, parcels and even his boot laces are rigorously searched in 
case he is carrying letters from the Turks. When the Turks learn what has 
happened, they resume ravaging Hungarian territory and even King 
Władysław cannot stop them, though repeatedly asked to try. The Polish 
envoy is finally released and returns to King Władysław.40 
 
The idea of cooperation with the Ottomans was not welcomed by all influential 
persons and on their way back to Poland, Gregory was accused of being a spy and 
imprisoned in Hungary for 20 weeks. In addition, both Jagiello and Witold were 
accused of plotting with the Ottomans against Hungary. Some historians claim that 
the number and content of rumors suggest there existed some kind of treaty, 
covenant or at least cooperation between the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom and the 
Ottomans,41 but no written evidence has been found so far. Both the king and duke 
Witold also tried to develop contacts with the Byzantine emperors. Major issue was 
unification of the churches (one should remember that most subjects of Lithuania 
and considerable part of the subjects of Poland, especially in Red Ruthenia were 
Orthodox Christians) and to some extent balancing the power of the Ottomans. 
Despite the fact that the union was not achieved, the contacts were quite extensive 
and Witold’s granddaughter Anna was married to John VIII Paleologus.42 
At the death of Jagiello in 1434 his eldest son Ladislaus III, who became the 
new king of Poland-Lithuania, was only nine years old. Because Witold had died 
earlier in 1430, the new situation led to the break of a civil war in Lithuania. Young 
age of the king left the real political power in the hands of cardinal Oleśnicki, one of 
Jagiello’s most devoted servants. The cardinal soon solved the complicated situation 
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in Lithuania by supporting Witold’s brother Sigismund Kiejsztutowicz, who became 
the new grand duke. With the death of king of Hungary Sigismund in 1440 a new 
problem of Hungarian succession appeared. The cardinal decided to apply for the 
Hungarian throne for young Ladislaus and as a result won it. Thus, the young king 
left for Hungary in 1440 without knowing the gloomy fate that awaited him.43 
 The short reign of king Ladislaus has been subject to many disputes among 
historians as events leading to the battle of Varna in 1444 are often seen as a 
milestone in establishing control over Balkans by the Ottomans, which consequently 
determined the fate of Byzantium.44 On the other, hand, notion of league or crusade 
against the Ottomans is still present in current historiography and research of 
historians is often pre-determined by this somewhat old-fashioned approach. 
Limitation of historiography understood in such archaic, crusading manner is 
discussed at the end of this chapter. What seems important for the history of the 
Ottoman-Polish relations is the fact that the young king undertook the crusade 
against the Ottoman forces contrary to the will of the Polish diet and Polish royal 
advisors.45 Consequently, despite the fact that the king was accompanied by some 
Polish knights at Varna, Poland-Lithuania did not officially take part in the 
crusade.46 Death of Ladislaus ended the fragile union with Hungary. The new king 
Casimir IV, was more concerned with northern issues during his reign, fighting for 
access to the Baltic Sea for his kingdom. When in 1456 the Moldavian prince Peter 
Aron accepted the Ottoman suzerainty Poland did not act properly which led to 
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strange double suzerainty over Moldavia, which continued under the reign of 
Stephan the Great (1457-1504).47 Stephen the Great renewed his vassalage to the 
king of Poland and sought agreement against the Ottomans with Uzun Hasan, which 
led to Mehmed II’s invasion on Moldavia in 1476.48 Poland tried to prevent the 
military action by sending envoy Marcin Wrocimowski to the sultan, but his mission 
was unsuccessful, though the relations remained peaceful and the strange status of 
Moldavia continued. In 1478 the Ottomans sent envoys to Poland with gifts and a 
proposal of combined action against Hungary, which was rejected by king Casimir.49 
When Mehmed II died in 1481, the Ottoman State was already a very strong and 
vast neighbor of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. Mehmed’s heir Bayezid II had 
different political interests in the northern areas of his realm than his father had. In 
1484 the new sultan launched a campaign against Moldavia and seized Kilia and 
Akkerman.50 Poland sent first an envoy51, and then military support to the 
Moldavian voivode, but the cities were not recaptured. As a result, Polish envoy 
Mikołaj Firlej was sent to the sultan to obtain truce.52 The ‘ahidnâme was prepared 
on 22 Mart 1489 in Latin. In brief, the sultan granted two years truce under 
condition that the Polish-Lithuanian side would keep friendship. In addition, all 
subjects and vassals of the sultan and the king were forced to follow the treaty.53 
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The death of Casimir in 1492 was an occasion to the renewal of the treaty 
with the new king John Albert. The original document being again written in Latin 
was considerably longer than the previous one. The treaty confirmed truce for three 
years and obliged both sides to return the war captives. What seems especially 
important from the perspective of future development of contacts and influences, 
economic activities between the two states were regulated in a special article for the 
first time. In addition, Bayezid II tried to encourage the merchants of the city of 
Lwów to carry on trade with the Ottoman merchants by granting the Lwów 
merchants low taxes (3.3 %). The trade would however develop much better several 
decades later.54 
 John Albert followed a policy of hesitation and could not decide whether to 
keep peace with the Ottomans or not. Despite the existing treaty with the sultan, in 
1497, king John decided to launch a campaign in Moldavia to regain access to the 
Black Sea lost to the Ottomans by their conquest of Akkerman and Kilia. However, 
the Moldavian voivode Stephen tried to use the situation to materialize his political 
ambitions. First, he asked the sultan for help against the Polish king, and then, 
pretending he changed his mind, asked for king’s assistance on the contrary. As a 
result, royal forces fell into ambush and the battle was lost. Gelibolulu Mustafa ‘Âli 
Efendi wrote that only one thousand people survived from the king’s army and 
around four-five thousands were killed.55 The numbers do not have to be treated 
seriously, but the result must have been a catastrophe, because there even exists a 
proverb connected with that battle in Polish: “Za króla Olbrachta wyginęła szlachta”, 
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which means “The gentry died out during Albert’s reign”. Moreover, the Ottomans 
sent 4,000 akıncıs into Poland under the command of Malkoçoğlu Bâli Bey in the 
following year.56 According to Gelibolulu Mustafa ‘Âli Efendi the akın started in 
winter: 
 
Kara Büğdan vilâyetine ‘asâkir-i Islâm akın itmeleri ve Kemâl Reîs deryâda 
Efrenc-i dalâlet-renc gemilerini sıyub emvâl-i firâvânla ganîmet itdükleri ve 
Ya’kûp Paşa Bosna ser-haddine Derencil nâm bân-ı Halîl ile ceng idüb 
bi’inâyeti’llâh tutub der-i devlete göndermesi ve Malkoç-Oğlı Bâlî Beğ 
mübâşeretiyle Leh keferesi cânibine vâki’ olan kış akını hasâreti ve Mîr-Livâ 
Nasûh Beğ Rûs-ı menhûs küffârına akın idüb iğtinâmı [...]57 
 
 
This was a shock for the border provinces, because the akıncıs pillaged several 
important towns, among others Braclaw, Sambor and Jaroslaw. The akıncıs were 
supported by the Tatars and the sources state that 40,000 people were killed. The 
number is perhaps exaggerated; nevertheless, the akın was painful for the local 
community.58 Hadîdî wrote a poetical description of that akın: 
 
Ali Beg’i kıgırdup didi hünkâr / Leh iklîmini yağma it yüri var 
Kızın, oğlın u mâlın eyle tâlân / Yıkup yakup it ol iklîmi vîrân 
Ali Beg eyleyüp emre itâ’at / Tovucalara âdem saldı o sâ’at 
İşidüp her birisi oldı şâdân / Ki san kesb eyledi genc-i firâvân 
Geçüp Tuna’yı leşger göçdi gitdi / Kesüp menzil Leh’ün iline yetdi 
Dahı hiç görmemişler yagı leşger / Müzeyyen şehr ü kendi ü şenlik 
iller 
Ali Beg gâzilere didi yağma /Gel imdi gör nice oldı temâşâ 
Gulâmun sîm-ber ra’nâlarını / Kız oğlanun semen-sîmâlularını 
Karınun, kocanun boynın urulrar / Kumâşun kıymetlüsin götürürler 
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Cevâhir sîm ü zerle toydı leşger / Gânimet mâlına gark oldı her er 
Yıkıldı yandı nice şehr-i meşhur / Harab oldı hezârân kend-i ma’mûr 
Çerisin cem’ idüp olmadı kâbil / Kiralile gele ola mukâbil 
Leh’ün iklîmini yakdı vü yıkdı / Yine leşger selâmet geldi çıkdı 
Bu da ol târihün içindeyidi / Tokuz yüz yıl dahı üçündeyidi59 
 
 
The amount of attention given to this event is surprising, because usually the 
Ottoman chroniclers and historians either do not include passages concerning 
Poland-Lithuania, like in the case of Duru Tarih by Bostanzade Yahya60 or they talk 
about the Polish kingdom once or twice, like in the Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman, where the 
anonymous author mentioned Leh tâyifesi vilâyeti while he presented geographical 
neighbors of the Ottoman State.61 Even more Central Europe oriented Tevârîh-i 
Cedîd-i Vilâyet-i Üngürüs by Câfer Iyânî contains very few mentions dealing with 
Poland-Lithuania, i.e. the closest neighbor of Hungary.62 In a way such a treatment 
of Polish issues by the Ottoman historians and chroniclers proves that the relations 
between the two states were not tense, because traditional enemies of the sultans like 
the Habsburgs or the shahs were devoted much more attention. 
The Moldavian problem proved that both sides had similar military potential 
and the rivalry would remain unsolved. Consequently, a new peace was signed in 
1499.63 The Moldavian expedition of John Albert was the last military episode in the 
bilateral issues and afterwards peace between the two states, despite tensions and 
various incidents, lasted for more than a century, until 1617. 
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In 1501, John Albert died and his brother Alexander, previously the grand 
duke of Lithuania obtained the Polish crown. The temporary treaty signed by 
Bayezid II with John Albert was extended into a five-years truce, granted by the 
sultan on 9 October 1502 and then ratified by the king on 21 February 1503.64 In the 
following year, both sides cooperated, trying to solve the Moldavian problems. A 
secret envoy was sent by the king to the sultan with a proposal of common action 
against the new Moldavian voivode Bogdan who, in king’s opinion, tried to spoil 
friendship between the king and the sultan. Meanwhile however, Bogdan obtained 
the support of Bayezid and the envoy did not succeed completely. In 1505 the 
Moldavian envoys came to Kraków with the proposal of marriage between Bogdan 
and the king’s elder sister Elizabeth in return for treaty with Poland and return of 
some lands to the Polish crown. The sultan was afraid of the Polish-Moldavian 
agreement but the marriage was about to be conducted and the agreement, which 
included homage to the Polish king, was written down. Then Alexander died 
unexpectedly and the plan was never carried out.65 
Death of Alexander in 1506 was followed by the coronation of his brother 
Sigismund, who was given the nickname “Stary” i.e. Sigismund the Old, due to the 
fact that he became the king in the age of forty and ruled for forty two years. His 
rule (and later the rule of his son Sigismund Augustus) was one of the phenomena in 
Europe at that time, which has often been classified as the golden age. Queen 
Elizabeth in England, Philip in Spain, two Sigismunds in Poland and Suleyman the 
Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire have often been portrayed by historians as great 
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rulers, who not only ruled, but also shaped the history of Europe. Hence, one should 
not be surprised that bonds of mutual friendly relations rose between Sigismund the 
Old and Suleyman the Magnificent. 
In 1507 Sigismund informed sultan Bayezid about his accession and the new 
truce for one year was signed in 1509.Then the treaties were renewed in 1510 for 
another year and in 1512 for five years. At the same time, the envoy tried to obtain a 
promise of truce from şehzâde Selim (importance of this attempt will be explained in 
the third chapter), but did not succeed. In 1511, the Crimean khan also allied with 
Sigismund against the Muscovites,66 but the Tatars were changing alliances quite 
often and unexpectedly. After the succession of Selim, truce was renewed twice: in 
1514 and in 1519, both times for three years. The conditions of the truce were not 
altered.67 After Selim’s return from the Persian campaign in 1515, a Polish envoy 
came to Istanbul to congratulate the victory,68 but in spite of good relations and 
obtaining the truce, there were rumors in 1516 that the sultan would attack Hungary 
and possibly march through Polish lands. However, Selim was involved in war in 
Egypt and therefore Sigismund, who did not want war with the Ottomans, managed 
to solve the issue diplomatically.69 
The succession of Suleyman to the throne in 1520 brought a very short 
instability in relations with Poland. Nobody expected that the new sultan would 
launch campaigns in Europe, at least not so soon. The conquest of Belgrade in 1521 
gave the sultan direct access to Hungary. Hungarian king Louis II Jagiellon asked 
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his brother-in-law Ferdinand of Habsburg for assistance, but was offered none. On 
the other hand, Sigismund the Old, who was the Hungarian king’s uncle, offered 
limited military support70, which was risky from the perspective of peace with 
Suleyman. This led to a brief campaign of Tatar and Ottoman forces, which attacked 
surroundings of Lwów in 1524. However, the perspective of war with the Ottomans 
was extremely unpopular among Polish nobility and soon strong policy towards 
friendly relations was applied. In 1525 an envoy was sent to Istanbul. Major purpose 
of the mission was truce with Poland for six years, which would also include 
Hungary. Suleyman did not agree with such a solution and granted a three year 
‘ahidnâme to Poland-Lithuania only. This left Louis II of Hungary without Polish 
support and led to the lost battle of Mohács in 1526.71 The document is interesting as 
it is the first ‘ahidnâme given in the Ottoman Turkish. It was given for three years 
and included articles that regulated the status of war captives and merchants. It 
seems that also the sultan was not interested in campaign in Poland and focused 
completely on Hungary. In 1521, the prince of Muscovy proposed Suleyman 
alliance against Sigismund the Old, but the sultan rejected, saying that he would not 
ally with such a barbarian.72 From the Ottoman perspective, a campaign against 
Poland-Lithuania would be unreasonable, because friendly relations guaranteed 
stability, necessary to deal with the Habsburgs and the Muscovites. 
One could argue about whether with Polish support, the Hungarian fate 
would have been different, but unquestionably, isolation of Hungary from both the 
Habsburgs and Poland-Lithuania changed the balance of power in the region. 
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However, motives behind reluctant attitude of both neighbors of Hungary seem to be 
different. While the Habsburgs wanted to weaken the position of Hungary in order to 
secure their own political influences, from the Polish perspective peace with the 
Ottomans was needed for the security of the country, threatened by the political 
ambitions of Moscow, Habsburgs and the Teutonic State in the north. This explains 
why the idea of crusade against the Ottomans would not find support among Polish 
or Lithuanian lords. 
King Louis II was killed at the battle of Mohács and soon after Suleyman 
conquered Buda. Death of the king brought political crisis as there were two 
candidates for the Hungarian throne: Ferdinand of Habsburg and John Zapolya, the 
voivode of Transylvania since 1510. The latter was elected king by the Hungarian 
diet on 10 November 1526 and crowned one day later as John I. On the other hand, 
Ferdinand has been the king of Bohemia since October 1526 and was pronounced 
king of Hungary by his supporters in December. As soon as the Habsburgs secured 
their positions in Italy and France, they launched a campaign in Hungary. Soon 
many of John’s subjects changed alliance and betrayed Zapolya. The Ottomans 
responded to this with an offer of support for John against the Habsburgs. Finally, in 
1527 John sent his envoy to Istanbul and asked for support. Suleyman acted 
promptly and soon signed a treaty with John.73 In these events Polish king 
Sigismund secretly supported Zapolya, as he was considered a good candidate 
against the Habsburg domination. In fact, Zapolya’s envoy was a Pole, “Lasczky”74, 
perhaps Łaski. The idea was popular among the Polish nobility as it balanced the 
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Habsburgs on the one hand and secured peace with the Ottomans on the other. 
However, secrecy was needed, as Polish nobility was afraid of joint Habsburg-
Muscovite actions against Poland-Lithuania. In 1528 an envoy was sent to Istanbul 
to obtain a new ‘ahidnâme from Suleyman. The document was granted easily.75 In 
the following year, the Moldavian voivode Peter Rareş attacked the Polish frontier 
district of Pokucie, pretending he was doing this on the sultan’s order. This led to 
Polish-Ottoman cooperation in the Moldavian issue again. At first Peter was 
defeated by hetman76 Tarnowski. Then in 1538, Polish and Ottoman troops entered 
Moldavia and Peter was dethroned by the sultan for disturbing the Ottoman friend 
i.e. the kingdom of Poland-Lithuania.77 This shows clearly that both sides tried to 
eliminate all potential sources of trouble and although Poland still did not resign 
from her claims to Moldavia, a new policy of common decisions and consultation 
can be observed. This policy was followed for most of the 16th century and the 
Moldavian issues became one of the most important elements of coexistence of the 
two states. 
At this stage it is possible to notice the rise of common Ottoman-Polish-
Lithuanian political purposes. Both states were interested in preventing the 
Habsburgs in the West and the Muscovites in the east from gaining too much power. 
Political reality dictated to the Polish nobility that Hungarian kingdom was too weak 
to look for independence and the Ottoman suzerainty was more attractive than the 
Habsburg control. In order to facilitate and strengthen friendship, the idea of “eternal 
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truce” with the Ottomans became popular.78 From current perspective, it seems 
natural but one should not forget that eternal peace between a Christian and a 
Muslim state (considering none of them was tributary) was unprecedented and 
revolutionary, bringing Polish-Ottoman relations into much higher level of 
development. Sigismund the Old was breaking the religious stereotypes of that time 
by backing up, as a Catholic, the Protestants in Prussia in 1525. The next step was 
eternal truce with the Muslim ruler.79  
Many historians researching the Ottoman presence in Europe have been 
influenced by stereotypical concepts, which label the Ottoman State as the 
suppressor of the Balkans and the greatest threat of Christendom. Such an attitude 
not only limits the spectrum of historical perspective, but it also falsifies vision of 
the past. It is striking that some traditional European historians do notice variety and 
flexibility of relations between various Christian countries, especially during the age 
of Reformation, but in case of relations with non-Christian states like the Ottoman 
Empire, they tend to treat European states as a monolith. In other words, as long as 
the European issues are concerned, even religious disputes are noticed, but whenever 
the question of contacts between a particular state and the Ottoman Empire arises, 
some historians tend to see the history through the crusading, Christian perspective. 
This attitude has also been shared by some Turkish historians, like Ahmet Refik, 
who wrote skeptically: “Baturi İştevan Sokollu’dan ve bilhassa Üçüncü Murad’dan 
gördüğü himayeyi pek çabuk unuttu”.80 
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The treaty, which was signed in 1533 between Sigismund the Old and 
Suleyman the Magnificent, stated that peace would be kept until the death of one of 
the two rulers. Moreover, Polish side wanted to include the sons of the two rulers 
into the treaty, but this was not accepted by the Ottomans.81 When Sigismund the 
Old died in 1548, Suleyman sent to Sigismund Augustus very frank condolences, 
showing real affection to his late father. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF OTTOMAN-POLISH RELATIONS 
DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
I. Period of Stability (1548-1572) 
 
The second half of the sixteenth century brought series of changes into Ottoman-
Polish relations. Having presented, in somewhat descriptive and chronological way, 
the gradual development of contacts between the two states until 1548, it seems 
useful to portray most important characteristics of the later period in more analytical 
way. Consequently, it seems more reasonable to analyze major issues in an overall 
context instead of describing the events chronologically. The death of the last 
Jagiellonian king Sigismund Augustus in 1572 and establishment of the elective 
monarchy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth marked a new political and 
diplomatic period, which is analyzed in the following chapter. 
Historians generally agree that friendly relations kept between the two states 
during reign of Sigismund the Old continued also after his death in 1548. His son 
Sigismund Augustus had been formally the king of Poland-Lithuania, and co-
reigned with his father since 1529. Immediately after the death of Sigismund I, 
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Sigismund Augustus received very warm and friendly condolences from the sultan 
himself and from Hürrem and Mihrimah sultans. Even though diplomatic letters tend 
to be written in a highly exaggerated style, it is uncommon to find following phrases 
in carefully planned letters, sent by the Ottomans to the foreign rulers, which 
indicates that there really existed good and intense relations between the two states: 
 
[...] mektubu şerifinizde olan muhabbetleri ve Hasan kulum takrir ettiğü 
dostlukları cana minnet bilüp Padişah Hazretlerine arz ettikden sonra Padişah-ı 
âlempenah Hazretleri şol kadar hazzetmiş ki kabil-i tabir değildir. Eyitmiş ki koca 
kıral bizim ile iki kardeş gibi idi İnşaallahurrahman bu kıral ile ata ile oğul gibi 
olalım demiş ve bu sürürdan hükmü şerif emr edüb kulum Hasan’ı hâki payı 
şerifinize irsal eyledi ve Kıral Hazretleri malum-i şerif ola ki Padişah yanında her 
ne husus için ki sizlerden fikr olunursa onun olkadar sizleri hayrile zikretmeği cana 
minnet bilürüz Bu dostluğa binaen mektubu muhabbet tehi dest olmamağ için iki çift 
don ve gönlek uçkuru ile ve altı dane dest-mal ve bir dane el yüz makraması 
gönderildi82 
 
It is easy to observe that since signing first treaties with Poland, the sultans tried to 
avoid conflicts and follow the path of stability and far going tolerance. Of course, it 
would be naive to think that they did it without interest. During the expansion 
northwards the Ottomans could have followed two different paths: they could either 
attack all the states, which would be very unreasonable and probably lead to forced 
common military response of Habsburgs and Poland-Lithuania, or they could choose 
the states they would not attack and try to build powerful position using quarrels 
among various European states. Poland-Lithuania was a perfect candidate for an ally 
because it tried to avoid the fate of the Czechs, thus opposing the Habsburgs in the 
southwest, and was afraid of the Muscovites and periodically allied with the Tatars 
against princes of Moscow. In addition, Polish vassal state of Prussia in the north 
made the situation even more complicated. With such neighbors, the Polish-
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Lithuanian State could not involve in a conflict with the Ottomans, which would be 
against the mutual interest of both states. From the Ottoman perspective the situation 
looked similar, but they also had to deal with Persia. In return equilibrium of power, 
in which neither side wanted its neighbor to become too strong, arose between the 
Polish-Lithuanian state and the Ottoman Empire. 
Numerous sources disclose that links between the two states were based 
upon quite complex system of interests and prejudices. As it happens among friends, 
the contacts were based not only upon benefits, but also upon pretensions and 
troubles. These did not influence however the very foundation of the relations. One 
of the most important issues at the state level was the idea of Polish-Ottoman 
alliance against Muscovy. Pajewski, who discussed this topic for the first time, 
claimed that Sigismund Augustus or one of his close advisors had proposed an idea 
of cooperation against the common Ottoman-Polish enemy in 1565. According to 
Pajewski, Poland tried to establish a strong alliance against the Muscovites with the 
Tatars, but because the Crimean khans often changed their policies, the king decided 
to send an envoy to Istanbul, thinking that the sultan, as the vassal suzerain of the 
khanate, would force the Tatars to help the king. The envoy, Mikołaj Brzeski (in 
Ottoman documents mentioned as Nikola), officially complained on Tatar raids and 
asked for return of the war captives, but he was ordered secretly to convince 
Suleyman to ally with the king against the Muscovites. The sultan was preparing his 
last Hungarian campaign and therefore did not express interest in the proposal. Then 
the envoy visited the şehzâde Selim and repeated the suggestion. The whole issue 
was conducted with the utmost care because the king was afraid of potential 
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Habsburg-Muscovite alliance against Poland-Lithuania. The issue of alliance must 
have been presented unofficially, because in the letter from the sultan to the king 
only the question of Tatar raids and war captives were mentioned.83 Relevant 
mühimme records also show that the sultan was not attracted by the proposal. There 
are two subsequent orders dated 13 müharrem 973 (10 August 1565) – the first one 
is the answer to the Polish king. This does not mention the Muscovites but contains 
aforementioned details concerning Tatar raids, war captives and question of Tatar 
military support for the king. In fact, this mühimme record must be the source of the 
letter prepared for the king. The following record, an order sent to the khan Devlet 
Giray, is similar. The sultan orders the khan to release the captives and send some 
troops to help the king, under condition the king pays the tribute he owes the khan.84 
It seems that Suleyman preferred not to get involved into the Muscovite trouble. 
Moreover, the sultan categorically prohibited the Moldavian voivode to pay taxes to 
Polish lords for Polish campaign against the Muscovites.85 Selim’s rule brought 
change into the situation. In 1568, the Ottomans started preparing for a new 
campaign. This time the major purpose was re-conquest of Astrakhan and 
construction of a channel linking Don and Volga rivers.86 Piotr Zborowski, the 
Polish envoy in Istanbul at that time informed the king about the Ottoman plans: 
 
I know for sure that the castles on our border were ordered to be provisioned 
and tidied. They are assembling people in closer sandjaks, but as I was 
informed, there were also rumors that they send the tsar of Perekop and the 
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sandjak bey of Caffa towards the Don River, up to Astrakhan to take from the 
hands of the Muscovite (prince) the two ordas he captured. They say that 
they will connect Volga into Don at one place, where these two rivers are 
very close, and they will build a castle in there. I know that three hundred 
riverboats full of canon balls and gunpowder were being brought into 
Caffa.87 
 
At the time when the Ottoman army was already moving towards Astrakhan the 
sultan sent Ibrahim Beg, the translator, to the king asking for help against the 
Muscovites and for right to pass Polish territories by the Ottoman troops.88 Closer 
look at the letter sent to the king shows that the sultan tried to explain his motives of 
war against the Muscovites and to convince the king to join him. The sultan stated 
that since the Muscovites had captured Astrakhan on the Kipchak border the Tatars 
could not go for pilgrimages easily, because the roads were closed. Moreover, the 
king had asked for help against the Muscovites previously and now the sultan thinks 
the suitable time has come. He also informed the king that concentration of Ottoman 
troops on Polish borders should not worry the king because the sultan did not intend 
to act against the old friendship. In the end Selim advised Sigismund to prepare for 
war against the common enemy.89 The letter gives an impression that Selim really 
wanted to join forces and fight together, but the plans were never carried out. 
According to Pajewski, major reason of fiasco was the policy followed by Devlet 
Giray, who did not like the idea of the Ottoman conquest of Astrakhan and led a 
kind of triple game with Selim, Ivan and Sigismund. The khan tried to misinform 
each interested side about the real situation and as a result gained as much influence 
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and independence as possible. When the khan became aware that his policy did not 
work as he planned and in facto brought together the sultan and the king, he decided 
to make a complaint on the king to the sultan using the attacks of the Cossacks as a 
pretext.90 Devlet Giray complained that the Cossacks came by the river Özi in 
şaykas i.e. small boats, attacked places on shores, captured boys, women and 
animals and ran away. The sultan reacted decisively and complained to Sigismund 
asking for action against such events.91 What is important, the sultan reminded the 
king that the Tatars were, as Muslims, under his protection. On the other hand, he 
stressed that the khan was a sovereign and ruled his own state and therefore the king 
and the khan should look for solution that was good for both sides.92 Of course, the 
Cossacks did attack the Tatar settlements quite often and also the Tatar attacks were 
not uncommon, but the khan seemed to have preferential treatment from the sultan.93 
Another important issue during the reign of Sigismund Augustus was the 
question of rule in Transylvania and the part of Hungary under the Ottoman rule. 
The split of Hungary and the rule of pro-Ottoman John Zapolya did not make the 
situation better for either side. The Habsburgs tried to secure political influences in 
eastern Hungary and in 1548 the widow of Zapolya, queen Isabelle Jagiellonka was 
forced to give up Transylvania to Ferdinand I. However, her counselor friar George 
made far going plans for unification of Hungary under the Habsburg rule without 
consulting Isabella. This led to political upheaval and a series of military actions, 
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which resulted in the queen’s abdication in 1551. Consequently, Ferdinand I was 
crowned the king of united Hungary and Isabelle with her son Petrovics fled to 
Poland to the court of Isabelle’s brother Sigismund Augustus.94 The Habsburgs did 
not think realistically and perhaps underestimated the consequences of such an 
action. Sultan Suleyman immediately started a campaign in Hungary against the 
Habsburgs.95 The sultan’s major idea was to bring back the son of Zapolya and to 
offer him the Transylvanian throne under the Ottoman supervision. The whole action 
was planned carefully and in 1553, both the sultan and the vizier Rustem Paşa sent 
letters to Isabelle and her son asking them to come back from Poland to 
Transylvania as soon as possible. In the letters, the queen and her son were advised 
to use the shortest possible way through Wallachia.96 Sigismund II, was interested in 
prosperity of his sister and by series of negotiations with the Ottoman and Habsburg 
sides, supported by military successes of Ottoman forces in Hungary, obtained the 
Moldavian throne back for Isabelle and her son.97 Common Ottoman-Polish interest 
prevailed and actually indirectly led to the future election of the Transylvanian 
voivode Stephan Bathory to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. 
When John II died in 1571, a very interesting letter was sent to the 
Sigismund. Because Zapolya’s son died heirless98 his uncle Sigismund was entitled 
to John’s property. Selim II informed Sigismund that the new voivode of Erdel 
would make a list of the late king John’s property and send this list to Istanbul. Then 
the king was asked to send his people to collect the property, but the sultan stressed 
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that non-personal items (i.e. the items belonging to the state) would be kept in 
Transylvania and the king should understand it.99 Death of John II brought political 
change to Transylvania because the sultan did not nominate a new king, but instead 
Stephan Bathory, the future king of Poland was appointed to the office of voivode of 
Transylvania.100 What seems to be a limitation of independence of Erdel should be 
perhaps analyzed through the Habsburg context. Lack of natural heir to the throne 
would bring series of dynastical claims from the Habsburgs whereas appointment of 
a voivode guaranteed stability and peace in the region. Bathory was a good 
candidate, because as a son of a former Transylvanian voivode he had experience in 
dealing with the Ottomans. In addition, he was an esteemed military commander 
under the rule of the late queen Isabelle.101 
Apart from these two important cases, everyday contacts between the two 
states concentrated on minor issues. In fact, both sides followed the rule “trust your 
friend but do not be blind”. Hence, the spies perhaps must have worked actively, at 
least the ones working for the Ottomans because news spread very fast. Usually 
orders concerning spying were sent to the voivodes of Moldavia,102 which seems 
reasonable, because it was the closest neighbor of Poland-Lithuania under the 
Ottoman suzerainty. Even smallest elements of suspicion caused immediate reaction 
of the authorities in Istanbul. Especially gathering of troops near the border caused 
anxiety. In such case, the commanders of border areas were usually ordered to check 
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what happens and what are the real intentions of the assembled military.103 These 
attempts were not always kept in secrecy. In a letter to Sigismund, dated January 
1572, Selim informs that his servants had sent him a report, claiming that many 
Polish soldiers approached the Wallachian border and are a burden to the land and 
the subjects. These military were under the command of a certain Laski and the 
sultan’s people did not know what the intensions of this man were. The sultan wants 
to know the reason and therefore sends Turgut Çavuş to whom the king should 
explain the situation. Selim adds that it is enough if the king assures him that he is 
not going to act against the old covenants and ancient friendship. In the end, Selim 
stresses that if the fact that the voivode of Wallachia is taking a bride from Poland is 
the reason, then he reminds he did not allow the Polish military to cross the border. 
And as a conclusion, the sultan asks to send him important news concerning any 
topic.104 Of course, such an attitude was useful and the Ottomans tried to turn the 
news into their advantage. For example in one of orders, dated 7 April1566, the 
sultan wrote to the Moldavian voivode that according to the news, Habsburg forces 
had gathered in Vaşporak and were going to attack Poland. The sultan ordered the 
voivode to write a letter to the Polish king, to inform him about the Habsburg’s 
plans, and to add that the sultan was going to use such an occasion and attack the 
Habsburgs.105 Once again, it becomes obvious that Selim was preoccupied with 
stability in Poland-Lithuania and on the border zone. 
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II. Diplomacy and Power Politics (1572-1595) 
 
Death of Sigismund Augustus on 7 August 1572 became a milestone, not only in 
Ottoman-Polish relations, but also in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. While in the neighboring states the rulers tried to accumulate 
maximal power in their hands, in the Commonwealth there was an opposite 
tendency towards “democracy of the nobles”, as often called by historians. The 
Jagiellonian era, which lasted since the late fourteenth century, was over and after 
Sigismund Augustus; every new king of Poland-Lithuania was to be elected by 
szlachta, i.e. the gentry from among noble candidates. The end of dynastical 
kingdom ruled by rather predictable (from the Ottoman perspective) Jagiellonian 
kings created a serious problem for the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa and 
sultan Selim II, who were interested in keeping friendly and peaceful relations with 
their northern neighbor. Such policy followed for most of the Jagiellonian era by 
previous sultans secured balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe. The death 
of Sigismund opened potential claims of the Habsburgs and princes of Muscovy to 
the Polish-Lithuanian throne therefore no wonder the Ottomans decided to follow a 
policy of active involvement into the Polish issues. 
 The role of the Ottomans in first free elections and Ottoman influence on 
Stephan Bathory are very interesting and controversial historical phenomena on 
which different views have been proposed by historians. Although the research has 
been conducted in this field by both Polish and Turkish historians, the results are not 
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entirely satisfactory. The basic disadvantage of existing research is one-sided 
perspective, enforced through the lack of comparative study of sources. It seems 
therefore necessary to rearticulate certain concepts concerning Ottoman influence on 
Polish policy by use of existing research in addition to numerous sources from 
mühimme registers and the Central Archive of the Old Documents in Warsaw. 
 
Ottoman diplomacy during the interregnum: Henry de Valois in power 
According to Pajewski, the idea of making Henry de Valois, the younger brother of 
Charles IX of France, the new Polish king was articulated for the first time by the 
grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, imperial translator Ibrahim Bey and a wealthy 
Jewish banker Jose Miquez. These three influential Ottomans revealed their plans 
for the Polish throne already at the end of summer 1569, i.e. three years before the 
death of Sigismund Augustus, to the financial agent of the French government, 
Claude du Bourg. Actually, Sokollu developed his plans further and proposed a 
marriage between Sigismund’s sister Anna Jagiellonka and Henry de Valois, in 
addition to another marriage between John Sigismund Zapolya of Transylvania and 
queen Margot of France. These plans, never carried out, would spoil Franco-
Habsburg relations and support the position of Transylvania, to which the Habsburg 
still had their claims.106 According to Pajewski, Sokollu did not forget the idea and 
later tried to convince another French official, Grantrie de Grandchamp that 
potential marriage between Zapolya and Margot would be prospective, because the 
sultan would support his election to the Polish throne. In order to make the proposal 
more attractive Sokollu promised to give up Wallachia and Moldavia to young 
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Zapolya in case the latter would be chosen. In 1571 young Zapolya died, which 
complicated the situation. Nevertheless, it is important to remember for future 
development of events that the idea of Polish throne for Henry de Valois was at first 
formulated by Sokollu.107 According to Ahmet Refik, Sokollu sent Mahmut Bey to 
Charles IX in order to arrange marriage between Margot and Zapolya, and to make 
the latter the king of Poland-Lithuania. But the envoy’s mission was unsuccessful, 
because Margot was married to Henry de Navarra in 1572. What is interesting, 
Ahmet Refik does not mention the death of young Zapolya as the major reason for 
the failure.108 Joseph von Hammer also points out sending Mahmud Bey to the king 
of France in order to arrange the marriage between Zapolya and Margot.109 Neither 
Ahmet Refik, nor Hammer refers to another plan arranged by Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, 
i.e. marriage between Anna and Henry. It seems that they did not have access to the 
reports of the French ambassadors used by Pajewski. 
 On 6 of August 1572, a messenger from the bey of Bender informed in 
Istanbul that Sigismund Augustus had died. Ottoman officials did not know what to 
do, because they did not obtain any official notification of king’s death. According 
to Pajewski, this explains the existence of nâmes written by the sultan to Sigismund 
posthumously.110 Such an idea seems to be a reasonable explanation. A good 
example of a nâme is the sultan’s answer to the king’s embassy, dated 18 rebiülahir 
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980, i.e. 28 August 1572111, three weeks after the news concerning Sigismund’s 
death arrived. 
 After these events, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa involved in a diplomatic game 
with the French court, by telling the French envoy that the late Sigismund’s sister 
Anna was chosen the new queen by Polish lords, provided that she would find a 
husband in two years. According to Pajewski, the real intention of the grand vizier at 
that time was not to support the candidacy of Henry to the Polish throne, but to 
create the illusion that he supported the idea, in order to spoil Franco-Habsburg 
relations. In reality, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa wanted the new Polish king to be chosen 
from among Polish lords.112 The most important from the Ottoman perspective, was 
preventing the election of Habsburg or Muscovite candidates, because this would 
change the balance of power. Ahmet Refik claims that there even existed a party 
supporting the Muscovite candidate in Poland-Lithuania.113 Moreover, according to 
Ahmet Refik, Sokollu obtained news concerning military intervention of the 
Muscovites in Poland-Lithuania in müharrem 980 (May-June 1572)114, which is 
imprecise, because the Muscovites could not intervene after Sigismund’s death 
before July. Either there is a mistake in dating of Refik’s source or the intervention 
did not concern Polish throne, but was one of numerous incursions of the 
Muscovites into the lands of the Commonwealth. In November 1572 official news 
concerning Sigismund’s death were brought into Istanbul. In response, the Ottoman 
authorities sent condolences and advice concerning the election. The sultan 
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suggested that it would be best to choose Anna and, in case this would be 
impossible, such a Polish or Lithuanian lord, who would guarantee friendly relations 
with the Porte. In addition, the grand vizier offered military support in case of 
emergency.115 
Interestingly enough, the grand vizier and the sultan ordered the Crimean 
khan to attack Poland-Lithuania before winter, but the Tatars did not do it for some 
reasons; instead, they spent winter in Moldavia creating great trouble for the local 
population. There is no direct evidence of orders given to the khan, but in the nâme 
sent to him in February the sultan explained that the Moldavian voivode had sent a 
complaint on Tatars, who would invade Poland-Lithuania, but instead entered his 
principality. The sultan reminded that Moldavia was a tributary state and such 
actions were not allowed.116 This indirect order reveals the fact that the attacks on 
the Commonwealth must have been planned, perhaps to consolidate the gentry and 
magnates to choose the new ruler as soon as possible. It is highly unlikely that the 
khan could invade Poland-Lithuania against the Ottoman will during such an 
important moment as interregnum. According to Pajewski at this point the French 
diplomacy engaged in obtaining the sultan’s support for the candidacy of Henry de 
Valois to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. Charles IX even demanded a statement from 
the sultan that the latter would support only Henry and would consider every other 
candidate the enemy of the Ottomans. However, Pajewski claims that the idea that 
had been initially developed by Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, was no more valid, partially 
due to prestigious purposes, but mostly because the grand vizier did not plan to 
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strengthen France and really wanted to see a Polish or Lithuanian lord on the 
throne117 This information sounds credible, because according to Polish nobleman 
Dzierżek, who was learning Turkish in Istanbul at that time, Sokollu said that there 
was no difference between the prince of Muscovy and Henry de Valois, and both 
were the same bad solution.118 Simultaneously, as Ahmet Refik suggests, Sokollu 
lost his patience and decided to prepare for military action in case the election would 
not be won by a friendly candidate. As a result, he sent orders to the beys of Silistre, 
Niğbolu, Vidin and Akkerman and to the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia.119 
Ahmet Refik does not mention that the same order was also sent to akıncı beys and 
the Crimean khan.120 This suggests that the vizier was afraid indeed of possibility of 
potential election of the Habsburg or the prince of Muscovy. Pajewski suggests that 
in March 1573 Sokollu strongly opposed the idea of electing Henry de Valois or any 
foreign candidate, and instead sent the names of supported candidates: Jakób 
Uchański, Jan Firlej, Jazłowiecki or some other esteemed lord. In addition, the 
letters were sent directly to some of supported candidates, to make the idea of 
election more attractive for them. In response, the senate assured the sultan that they 
would not choose a candidate who could not keep peace with the sultan.121 
Pajewski’s idea is true, but only partially. Similarly, Ahmet Refik also proposed a 
partial solution. According to him, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa at first sent simultaneous 
orders to the Polish lords122 (to choose one from among themselves as a king), and to 
                                                 
117 Pajewski.  “Turcja wobec elekcji Walezego”, pp. 17-19. 
118 ibid.  p. 22. 
119 Ahmet Refik.  Sokollu, p. 160. 
120 MD XXI 405, 425. 
121 Pajewski.  Turcja wobec elekcji Walezego, p. 25-26. 
122 The names of the lords are not mentioned. The form “Leh beylerine” is used. Perhaps the 
addressees were the members of the senate. 
 52 
the previously mentioned beys to be ready for military action. Then, according to 
Refik, the French asked the sultan for support and in a nâme dated 7 Zilkade 980, i.e. 
11 Mart 1573, the sultan supported Henry’s candidacy.123 
The sources suggest a different interpretation of events. The letters were 
indeed sent, as both historians wrote, but they are dated 14 zilkade 980 (18 Mart) 
that is a week later than the date Ahmet Refik suggested. Moreover, there were 
several orders sent on that day, including all the orders mentioned by Refik, i.e. the 
orders for the beys to prepare for military intervention, and orders for the Polish 
lords concerning the royal election, together with the list of supported candidates. In 
addition, contrary to Pajewski’s suggestions, the orders for the lords and bishops 
stated clearly that the sultan would support Henry de Valois in case the local 
candidate could not be chosen.124 According to Pajewski, Sokollu decided to support 
Henry in the end of March, when the news concerning the attack of the prince of 
Muscovy on the Commonwealth spread in Istanbul. Pajewski also supposed that 
Sokollu was preparing a war in case an unfriendly candidate would be elected.125 He 
was right only as far as the war preparations were concerned. At this point, it is 
possible to come back to the aforementioned Ahmet Refik’s ideas concerning the 
attack of the Muscovites and the pro-Muscovite party. There exists a mühimme 
record, dated 7 müharrem 981 (9 May 1573) in which the sultan informs the voivode 
of Moldavia that he got his letter containing news on Muscovite attacks on Poland-
Lithuania. This suggests that Ahmet Refik misdated the order and, as a result, put it 
into a wrong context. 
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 In late June 1573 Sokollu apparently lost his patience and without waiting for 
the result of the royal election, decided to “help” solve the problem. In an order sent 
to Devlet Giray, dated 21 June, the sultan wanted the khan to attack Poland with the 
beys of Silistre, Niğbolu and Vidin, under the pretext that the lords chose their king 
from Muscovy that they did not pay tribute to the khan for seven years, and that they 
attacked Muslims at the borders.126 The attacks were not carried out, because seven 
days later it was already known in Istanbul that Henry de Valois had been elected a 
new king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This news stimulated activity of 
the Ottoman. At first the letters were sent to the lords of Poland-Lithuania, in which 
the sultan congratulated them conducting the election according to his advice. He 
also informed that if the Muscovites attacked Poland the khan would give military 
support to the lords.127 Orders were also sent to the bey of Silistre, the khan, and the 
akıncı beys to be prepared for military support to the Commonwealth in case of any 
attacks.128 Similarly, the Moldavian voivode was ordered to oversee the development 
of events in Poland-Lithuania and to find out real intensions of the Polish and 
Lithuanian lords.129 This suggests that Sokollu was not completely sure whether 
Henry would be really crowned. 
One must remember that the period between election and coronation was 
rather long, which opened way to unpredicted development of situation. To avoid 
surprises the Ottoman diplomacy involved deeply in preparations of Henry’s arrival 
into his new realm. Ahmet Refik stresses that Sokollu tried to make the arrival as 
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convenient as possible and suggested that the king should sail by sea into one of the 
Ottoman ports on the Aegean Sea, than visit Istanbul and go to his new kingdom 
through Wallachia and Moldavia.130 In this way, he would avoid the dominions of 
the Habsburgs. There are indeed many records in the mühimmes about this issue. 
The sultan wrote letters to the king of France and Henry as Refik suggests.131 
Moreover, he also promised in these nâmes to defend the Commonwealth from the 
Habsburgs and Muscovy. In other words, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa tried to use the 
election to strengthen the position of the Ottoman Empire, and he even stressed that 
the Polish and Lithuanian lords had asked the sultan for advice and the sultan 
suggested Henry, which was not true. The grand vizier then followed a very careful 
policy towards the Commonwealth – he decided to be patient until the king’s arrival 
and even ignored Polish raids in the borderlands, allowing the bey of Akkerman only 
a very limited revenge for the frontier attacks.132 In November and December 1573, 
the grand vizier was preparing for the arrival of Henry into the Ottoman Empire. He 
informed both Henry and his brother Charles IX about possible ways into Kraków 
via Dubrovnik or Bosnia and ordered the kapudanpaşa, the beys of Timişvar and 
Kilis, and the voivode of Transylvania to prepare for Henry’s arrival.133 In the end, 
Henry declined Sokollu’s proposal and came via Mainz and Frankfurt on the Oder, 
crossing the Polish border on 17 January 1574, to be crowned on 21 February.134 
Stephan Bathory, the voivode of Transylvania, and the future king of Poland-
Lithuania wanted to attend the ceremony, but was prohibited by the sultan’s order. 
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The sultan suggested that it would be better if Bathory stayed in Transylvania and 
sent several esteemed lords to the coronation.135 Henry’s reign did not last long, due 
to premature death of Charles IX on 30 May 1574. With Henry’s escape from 
Kraków to France, all efforts of the Ottoman diplomacy finished unsuccessfully. 
However, experience gained by Sokollu during the first interregnum turned to be 
very useful during the second one. 
 
Diplomacy continued: Stephan Bathory – the Ottoman vassal? 
Henry de Valois was informed about his brother’s death two weeks later and decided 
to flee secretly from Kraków in the night of 18 June 1574.136 The news concerning 
Henry’s escape reached Istanbul a month later, on 18 July. Sokollu Mehmed Paşa 
did not expect such a sudden change of situation and he had to develop a new 
strategy concerning the Commonwealth. On the one hand, Henry’s escape was 
advantageous from the Ottoman perspective, because it was easy to predict that the 
foreigners would not be as popular candidates to the throne as they used to be.137 No 
historians mention that the news of Charles’s death and Henry’s escape could be 
delivered to Istanbul earlier. However, there exists a mühimme record, dated 21 June 
1574, in which the sultan orders Abdi Çavuş to return with the letters he was 
supposed to give to the Polish king, because they became invalid.138 It can be 
interpreted that the sultan was informed about the death of Charles IX and Henry’s 
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escape by this time. This could be validated somehow perhaps if the letters given to 
Abdi Çavuş were found. 
Pajewski claims that the letters for the Polish-Lithuanian senate were 
prepared immediately and the king of Sweden was proposed as a new candidate for 
the throne in Kraków. However, the letters were not sent, because, as in the case of 
Sigismund Augustus’s death, the sultan did not obtain official notification of 
Henry’s escape. As a result, the question of election was not included into the 
letters.139 Indeed, the nâme for the Polish lords dated 24 July 1574 mentions that the 
sultan is aware of Henry’s escape, but election is not mentioned.140 
Both Ahmet Refik and Pajewski agree that grand vizier was very well aware 
of the fact that most influential candidate in the forthcoming election was the worst 
enemy of the Porte, Maximilian the Habsburg.141 As long as Poland-Lithuania was 
in friendly relations with the Ottomans, neither Habsburgs nor the Muscovites could 
change the balance of power, but simultaneously Sokollu knew that he could drag 
the Commonwealth under the Ottoman influence only by fear of war.142 This 
resulted in Sokollu’s order to the Crimean khan to prepare for military intervention 
in case one of the hostile candidates was chosen.143 Pajewski and Ahmet Refik 
mention this order, but they are mistaken about the date of orders. According to 
Ahmet Refik, when Henry fled, Sokollu gave orders to the khan, serhat beyi, and the 
beylerbeyi of Budin to prepare for war.144 
                                                 
139 Pajewski.  Turcja wobec elekcji Batorego, pp. 8-9. 
140 MD XXVI 278. 
141 Ahmet Refik.  “Lehistan’da Türk Hakimiyeti”. p. 227; Pajewski.  Turcja wobec elekcji Batorego, 
p. 7. 
142 Ahmet Refik.  “Lehistan’da Türk Hakimiyeti”. p.227. 
143 MD XXVI 413. 
144 Ahmet Refik.  Sokollu, p. 165. 
 57 
This is true and the order, in which the grand vizier ordered the khan to be 
ready for intervention was dated 17 August.145 In addition, the khan was ordered not 
to do anything against the ‘ahid with the Commonwealth. Pajewski does not give the 
date for the Tatar raids, but mentions them before the news concerning supposed 
election of Ivan. In fact, the Tatars raided eastern provinces of the Commonwealth in 
October 1575, after the first unsuccessful election.146 Another attacks took place 
earlier when Sokollu Mehmed Paşa ordered the bey of Fülek to attack Poland-
Lithuania under the pretext that that the son of the prince of Muscovy had been 
elected the king of the Commonwealth. According to Ahmet Refik, Sokollu hoped 
that such acts would force the Polish and Lithuanian lords to apply to the sultan for 
advice. Moreover, Ahmet Refik claims that this was the initiative of Sokollu and the 
vizier did not consult the divan in that matter.147 The order is dated 4 September.148 
What is interesting, Pajewski claims that there were in fact rumors in Istanbul in 
August that Ivan would be elected the king. The rumors were spread by Stephan 
Bathory’s agent Rac, because Bathory, the vassal of the sultan and the prince of 
Transylvania, wanted to be elected the king of Poland-Lithuania. After the gossips 
made the Ottoman officials uneasy, Rac suggested to the grand vizier that Bathory’s 
chance in Polish elections was growing.149 After comparing opinions of both 
historians it sounds reasonable to support the idea that perhaps Sokollu’s orders for 
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the bey of Fülek were in fact influenced by the Bathory’s agent of,150 and the Tatar 
raids mentioned by Pajewski were in fact the attacks prepared by the bey of Fülek. 
 Bathory, whose candidacy to the throne in Kraków was not considered 
seriously, was in fact very interested in winning the election. He must have been 
aware that in case the Habsburgs or the Muscovites gained control over the 
Commonwealth the position of his homeland Transylvania would change drastically. 
With the Ottoman support, he was able to face the Habsburgs and keep far going 
independence. This would doubtlessly change if the Polish-Lithuanian throne passed 
into hands of the enemy of the Ottomans. The best choice, from his perspective, was 
to win the election. Successful action of Bathory’s agent in Istanbul yielded a 
positive result. Sokollu first sent a letter to the senate in which he mentioned the 
Polish lord Kostka and the king of Sweden as candidates supported by the Porte. 
After Bathory’s diplomatic intrigue, Sokollu sent a messenger with verbal orders for 
the çavuş who had taken the letters. The çavuş was told to mention Bathory as the 
third supported candidate.151 
 The çavuş gave the speech to the diet in Warsaw and the lords were pleased 
with the sultan’s suggestions. Theoretically, all three candidates were acceptable, but 
in fact, the papal nuncio strongly opposed the Polish candidate and Bathory, while 
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supporting the Habsburgs.152 It is important to point out that the çavuş arrived in 
Warsaw on 8 September,153 which was almost three months after the first 
unsuccessful election attempt. In October, the eastern provinces were raided by the 
Tatars, which facilitated election because the Polish lords treated it as a warning 
from the sultan. As a result, the king was elected in December. The majority of the 
lords decided to elect the Polish candidate, but both nominated candidates declined 
the offer. As a result, the senate and the papal nuncio supported the Habsburg, which 
led to riots and simultaneous election of two candidates: the Habsburg and Bathory. 
The latter was elected by adversaries of the Habsburg candidate, who constituted the 
majority. The election of Bathory was reconfirmed on 18 January 1576.154 Pajewski 
unconvincingly claims that Sokollu did not treat the candidacy of Bathory 
seriously.155 From Sokollu Mehmed Paşa’s perspective, a friendly ruler in Poland 
was the most desirable thing. According to both Pajewski and Dopierała, Sokollu 
was afraid that Bathory would become the enemy of the Ottomans and therefore 
Bathory’s name was always the last among the candidates supported by the sultan.156 
This seems controversial, because the Ottomans engaged in a developed diplomatic 
game to protect Bathory against the Habsburg candidate, warning the emperor that 
the Commonwealth was taken by the Ottoman under protection and no military 
actions by the Habsburgs would be tolerated.157 Furthermore, immediately after 
election the letter of support was sent to Bathory. The sultan wrote that Bathory 
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should accept the Polish crown and, as long as he did not act against the Ottomans, 
he would be offered their friendship.158 Ahmet Refik mentions that the sultan wanted 
to be sure that the new king would be safely crowned and therefore gave orders 
concerning his escort.159 The grand vizier and the sultan really gave importance to 
this issue, because all the lords from the Polish-Lithuanian borderland were ordered 
to help Bathory be prepared for military action as long as the news concerning 
coronations come.160 In addition, strong orders for the emperor were sent in which 
the sultan warned that he would treat the Habsburg intervention in Polish issues as a 
cause of war with the Habsburgs.161 All these preparations show that the question of 
Polish election was vital for the Ottoman policy and the candidacy of Stephan 
Bathory was not treated lightly. 
 According to Ahmet Refik, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa wanted to change Poland-
Lithuania into a vassal state, similar to Moldavia, Wallachia or Transylvania.162 
Such an idea seems a bit naive. For an experienced statesman like Sokollu it must 
have been obvious that what was possible with small principalities could not work in 
one of the biggest European states of that time. Moreover, leaving aside the size and 
the population, one should not forget that Poland-Lithuania in the late sixteenth 
century was not a centralized monarchy like the Ottoman Empire, but the republic 
ruled by elective kings. Therefore, the power of the kings was limited by the diet and 
the senate, and even if the ruler were a subject of the sultan, the rest of the officials 
would not be. Of course, in the end of the sixteenth century, the royal power was 
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still considerable, but not strong enough to reduce the Commonwealth into a vassal 
state. Perhaps that is why Ahmet Refik accuses Bathory of being anti-Ottoman.163 
He does not seem to recognize that being a friendly ruler would not necessarily 
mean to be subjective. In addition, major accusation focuses on the fact that the 
Poles raided the Ottoman borderland and territories of the Crimean khanate. This 
interpretation suggests that Ahmet Refik was not aware of the internal troubles the 
Commonwealth had to face. Bathory, despite all his efforts, could not prevent the 
Cossack attacks, because the Cossacks were out of control. The king’s attitude 
towards those rebels was very decisive and he executed some important Cossack 
leaders, together with some Polish lords who invaded borderland in order to improve 
the relations with the sultan.164 On the other hand, it is true that Sokollu Mehmed 
Paşa did try to influence the new king by sending him somewhat patronizing letters, 
treating Bathory like a vassal.165 But this did not mean that Bathory agreed for such 
a treatment. In fact, the entire issue is very delicate. In general, the relations between 
Bathory and the sultan were good. Soon after the coronation, Bathory sent a letter to 
the sultan. The sultan replied asking, traditionally, for the tribute for the Tatars and 
warning that the Habsburgs were following an anti-Ottoman policy.166 In 1577 the 
new âhidnâme was prepared in Istanbul and sent to the king.167 The text was a 
slightly changed version of former treaties. Some articles concerning freedom of 
trade were added.168 The king’s successes in wars against the Muscovites and his 
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diplomatic skills soon made him an influential political figure. In 1578, he secretly 
supported first English mission into the sultan. The envoy, William Harborne 
traveled to Istanbul via Poland and Moldavia.169 
 Most historians tend to treat Bathory’s policy against the Ottomans as 
unfriendly. European historians were usually convinced that Bathory, after having 
been elected the king of Poland-Lithuania, at first cooperated with the Ottomans in 
order to fight the Muscovites and after his successes in the East, he wanted to build 
anti-Ottoman Christian league.170 What is striking, some Turkish historians also 
followed this idea, presenting Bathory as a very ungrateful person, who very fast 
forgot the sultan’s support in the election.171 On the contrary, J. von Hammer, who 
wrote in the eighteenth century, represented a different view, treating Bathory like a 
blind servant of the sultan.172 More positive approach to the relations between 
Bathory and the Ottomans has been proposed by İnalcık173 and Danişmend174 who 
formulated the idea of coherent Ottoman policy in the north. According to these two 
historians, Bathory and the khan were the best guarantee of keeping the balance of 
power against the Muscovites. In fact, this idea is close to later research of 
Dopierała, who suggests that Bathory treated the Ottomans in a completely different 
way than he treated the other neighbors of his realm. The Habsburgs, the Muscovites 
and the Crimean khanate were treated by the king from the position of power. The 
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stronger his position in Poland-Lithuania the more decisive policy he applied. In the 
case of the Ottomans, such a strategy could not be realized, because from the very 
beginning, even before the election, the best supporter of Bathory was the sultan. As 
a result, it would be very impractical from Bathory’s perspective to turn back to the 
Ottomans, because he had no other ally. The Habsburgs were interested in taking 
control over Transylvania, which could not be accepted by Bathory, and the 
Muscovites were the major target of Bathory’s military actions, so they could not 
offer him interesting alliance either. This however does not mean that Bathory was 
following the sultan’s orders.175 Lack of military conflicts with the Ottomans 
(excluding minor issues connected with the Cossacks, some Polish lords and the 
Tatar raids) was the best proof of good relations between the two states and of 
practical realization of the common Ottoman-Polish balance of power in the region. 
 
Relations in Danger: Sigismund III Vasa (1587-1632) 
Bathory’s reign lasted only ten years, between 1576 and 1586. He died at 
considerably young age and his death once more caused a problem of succession. 
News of Bathory’s death arrived at Istanbul in the beginning of müharrem 995 (in 
the middle of December 1586).176 The Ottomans did not involve into the third 
election as strongly as they did in the previous ones. The reigning sultan Murad III 
ordered the voivode of Transylvania to spy on the Habsburgs177 and the letters to the 
Polish lords were sent in April 1587. In the letters, the sultan advised them to choose 
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someone from among Polish lords if they wanted continuation of the sultan’s 
friendship. Murad strongly opposed election of the candidates from Austria, 
Muscovy, France or England.178 Despite the lack of as aggressive and direct 
diplomatic actions as previously, the Porte was deeply interested in the result of the 
election and took precautions to prevent the Habsburg’s intervention. What is 
strange is that the Habsburgs tried to obtain the Ottoman support in their struggle for 
the Polish throne179, which did not present their political abilities in a good way. 
Supporting the Habsburgs would perhaps be the last possible solution for the sultan. 
Apart from sending the letters, Murad III ordered the voivodes of Moldavia and 
Transylvania to keep an eye open on events in the Commonwealth and inform him 
of developments. Meanwhile, the sultan prohibited the voivodes to do anything 
against the treaties with Poland-Lithuania,180 being afraid that this could perhaps 
influence the result of the election. 
 The election was difficult. The Habsburg candidate had a strong support of 
the pope and the king of Spain. On the other hand, influential magnates like 
chancellor Zamoyski had strong anti-Habsburg preferences. The election ended with 
the civil war and forced coronation of Sigismund III on 27 December, but this did 
not end the trouble. The war continued and until the imprisonment of Maximilian by 
chancellor Zamoyski. The Habsburg candidate was released only on condition that 
he would abandon claims to the Polish throne.181 All these events were carefully 
watched in Istanbul. The sultan sent several letters to the Polish lords in which he 
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made it clear that he would support Sigismund, but not the Habsburg. In addition, 
the sultan ordered the borderland beys to prepare for military action in case of 
emergency and to collect the news constantly.182 The sultan also sent a warm nâme 
to the lords of the Commonwealth, expressing his satisfaction and friendship. Murad 
stressed that he hoped that Sigismund was not only elected, but that he would be also 
successfully crowned.183 One might assume that this somewhat passive attitude was 
strongly influenced by the Ottoman involvement in military actions against Georgia 
and Persia.184 
 Sigismund III Vasa’s reign (1587-1632) changed the peaceful relations with 
the Ottomans. The king did not follow the policy of Bathory and soon revealed pro-
Habsburg and pro-Catholic views, which could not be accepted by the Porte. In 
addition, he delayed sending the envoy into Istanbul, which was received as serious 
disgrace by the Porte.185 But what really damaged the relations were the constant 
Cossack attacks on the Ottoman and Crimean lands and Polish military interventions 
in Moldavia in 1595. Before this, in 1591, a new ’ahidnâme was granted by the 
sultan and the perspectives of crisis seemed overcome. On the other hand, the 
situation in Transylvania became unstable with the war against the Ottomans 
launched in 1593.186 The sultan tried to obtain Sigismund’s support in the campaign 
against the rebellious principality. He sent Sigismund a nâme, in which he informed 
that he had already given orders to launch a campaign and to try to catch the voivode 
alive. The most interesting point of the sultan’s letter however was the proposal that 
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the king should send his own candidate for ruling Transylvania, together with strong 
military support and then the Transylvanian subjects, tired of war, would support 
Sigismund’s man. This letter contains several things worth mentioning and therefore 
a summary of the content is given below:  
 
1. The sultan [hereafter S.] ordered the vizier Mehmed Paşa to launch a campaign against the 
rebellious ruler of Erdel. 
2. The S. ordered the vizier to stop attacking the castles, instead the vizier should try to catch 
the rebel alive and punish him. 
3. The S. ordered the khan Gazi Giray to help the vizier with his forces in Erdel. 
4. The vizier awaited the khan near Akkerman. 
5. The vizier, breaking the orders, went to Waradyn and burnt the city, then he started 
conquering the castle, but he had to abandon it and spent the winter guarding the Hungarian 
border with his army. 
7. The S. will launch a new campaign in Vienna or Transylvania, and his army will be 
ordered to plunder, burn and destroy these lands. 
8. The great grandfather of the sultan (i.e. Suleyman) was the protector of Erdel and always 
looked after poor people so that they had peaceful life. 
9. The current ruler not only does not accept the sultan as his protector, but he tries to 
destroy his lands. 
10. The sultan would prefer to see Transylvania unspoiled and therefore he thinks of a 
solution. 
11. There is no real heir of rulers of Erdel among the S.’s subjects so the S. does not have a 
good candidate for this office. 
12. The current ruler of Erdel quarreled with Maximilian von Habsburg when the latter 
conquered Waradyn and two other castles, so the Erdel ruler does not really have any friends 
left. 
13. The king's envoys asked the S. to grant the king right to nominate a candidate for the 
ruler of Transylvania. 
14. The S. agrees for this and the king should appoint the voivode and inform the S. about it. 
However, the candidate will follow the old tradition and be obedient to the S. 
15 The S. thinks such a solution is good for the Porte, for Poland, and for Transylvania. 
16. The S. asks the king to confirm the old friendship when the S.'s people (Müstedam 
Çavuş & Dragoman Hawe) arrive to the king. 
17. The king should take revenge on the voivode for the blood of the lords of Erdel he shed. 
18. The S. knows that one of the Erdel lords (no name) took shelter in Poland, so he or the 
king’s servant Casper, son of Bekierz (whoever of those two seems more appropriate to the 
king) should be made a voivode. 
19. The K. should send a strong military support with the candidate because then the lords 
and subjects in Erdel will turn against the current ruler (the king is advised to sent news to 
Transylvania before sending people). 
20. If necessary, the Wallachian voivode Heremiasz, or the sancakbey of Tenchin will bring 
their forces in support. 
21. The king. can lead the voivode through the Wallachian border. 
22. The S. asks the king. to act wisely and to send the news to the S. 
23. The S. asks the king to punish the horrible Cossacks. 
24. the S. asks the king. to send the çavuş back immediately187. 
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In other words, the sultan thought that keeping control over the principality together 
with the king, would be better than letting the Habsburgs gain the profits. It is 
interesting that the sultan was ready for military cooperation, because his orders 
were very practical and detailed. The fragment where the sultan calls for peace in the 
province for the sake of the subjects illustrates the Ottoman notion of justice. The 
trouble was indeed solved with the help of chancellor Zamoyski; in 1599, Andreas 
Bathory was accepted by both the Polish king and the sultan. However, his rule did 
not last long either because he was murdered the same year and Transylvania once 
more fell into series of wars that lasted until peace made with the Ottomans in 
1606.188 
 Ottoman-Polish contacts in the last decade of the sixteenth century were 
determined by the new political situation. The death of Bathory was the end of close 
and friendly relations between the two states. The Jagiellonians and Bathory were 
interested in southern provinces of their realms, whereas Sigismund III Vasa 
involved in dynastical disputes with Sweden and did not give necessary attention to 
the southern border. In addition, moving the king’s court from Kraków to Warsaw in 
1596 changed the gravity and geographical perspective of the state. Sigismund 
expressed deep interest in the Swedish issues and focused on war for the Swedish 
throne, leaving the southern border under influence of local lords like chancellor 
Zamoyski. These people often had ambitious plans concerning recapture of 
Moldavia with Wallachia and did not care for the interest of the state. No wonder the 
cooperation with the Ottomans gradually became more difficult.
                                                 
188 History of Transylvania.  pp. 295-99. 
 68 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
ASPECTS OF OTTOMAN-POLISH RELATIONS 
 
 
I. The Rulers, the Envoys and Practical Diplomacy 
 
Kołodziejczyk gives a detailed description of diplomatic procedures and therefore 
there is no need to focus on technical side of diplomacy.189 Instead, it seems 
interesting to analyze practical aspects of diplomacy and activities of messengers 
and envoys that can be traced in the source material. It is worth mentioning that 
Polish and Ukrainian archives and libraries contain very rich collections of 
descriptions of diplomatic mission, together with manuscripts and reports prepared 
by the envoys. Most of the material is written in Polish and therefore its use by the 
Ottoman historians is limited. Very few of the relations were published entirely or 
partially. Perhaps new editions of such material, together with translation into some 
commonly used languages would contribute greatly to research of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Crimean khanate, because quite often Polish reports contain details 
one would not find in other sources.  
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One of the most important issues for the king Sigismund Augustus was the 
arrangement of the covenant with şehzâde Selim during the life of Suleyman. The 
Jagiellonians wanted to be sure that the friendly relations with the Ottomans would 
continue also after death of Suleyman the Magnificent. This was a typically 
European attitude, where the legal documents issued by a ruler, were treated as valid 
also after his death. The ‘ahidnâmes were, on the contrary, always granted for a 
definite period, and they were considered invalid after the sultan’s death. Hence, the 
Jagiellonian diplomacy wanted to obtain not only eternal truce, but also promise 
from a şehzâde that he would keep friendly relations as a sultan. These attempts 
were succeeded in two steps. At first, in 1553, sultan Suleyman granted the new 
eternal peace after death of Sigismund the Old. The next step was achieved in 1564, 
when the Polish envoy Jazłowiecki obtained truce from şehzâde Selim. This 
unprecedented solution secured Polish-Ottoman relations in case of Suleyman’s 
death.190. The truce was renewed in 1568, when Selim confirmed the document as 
the sultan. Polish embassy, consisting of the envoy Zborowski and three hundred 
people, brought precious gifts for the sultan, which shows how important this issue 
was treated by the Polish king.191 Of course wealthy and numerous embassies were 
sent in order to influence psychologically the sultan and the court by creating 
positive and powerful image of Polish-Lithuanian State. This policy was followed by 
both sides quite willingly. According to Danişmend, Selim developed a very rich 
greeting ceremony for western envoys. During such events, goods brought by the 
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sultan from Persian campaigns were exhibited. The major purpose of such early 
psychological attempts was to convince the Christian rulers that the sultan was the 
most powerful and influential monarch of the time.192 Another method used by the 
Ottomans to build their prestige outside the Ottoman State was sending messengers 
with news concerning the sultan’s war triumphs and celebrating important events 
during feasts. This practice was already in use during the reign of Selim I, when 
successes in war against Shah İsmail were highly celebrated: 
 
Anadolu beylerbeyi Sinan Paşa Rumeli beylerbeyi olup, Zeynep Paşa 
Anadolu’ya geçip, Hüsrev Paşa Karaman beylerbeyi oldu. Devlet hazînesi 
sandıklarını açıp, emirlerin umûmuna ve ileri gelenlere yollu yolunca 
hil’atlar verdiler. Bütün kapı halkına ve yeniçerilere genel bahşîş verip, 
timar sahiplerinin tîmârını yükselttiler. Halkın hepsi istediklerini elde edip, 
sevindiler. Mamur Anadolu ülkelerine, genç tâlihli şehzâde -ömrü uzun 
olsun- hazretlerine ve Mısır sultanına, İslam şehirlerinden hükûmet merkezi 
Kostantiniyye ve Edirne ve mamur Bursa kadılarına ve diğer müslümanların 
hâkimlerine islam serhaddi olan Mora, Bosna, Semendire ve Hersek 
sancaklarına haraç veren maıyyet hizmetlilerini Eflak ve Buğdan beylerine 
ve kudretli sultanlardan mutlu Tatar vilâyetinin mutlu hanına ve 
hırıstiyanların kırallarından Leh, Çek ve Rus ve Engürüs vilâyetleri 
kırallarına, Avrupa adalarından Venedik ve Sakız beylerine, tüm sultanın 
memleketlerine bu şânı yüce fetih için müjde mektupları yazılıp, Saba 
yürüyüşlü ve nesîm hızlı ulaklar gönderildi.193 
 
 
The celebrations were probably carried out after Selim’s return to Istanbul on 11 
July 1515.194 The authorities in Istanbul shaped morale of their subjects and respect 
for the sultan by celebrating successes not only in the greatest imperial cities, but 
also in the provinces and vassal states. After the conquest of Georgia by vizier 
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Ferhad Paşa in 1587, the voivode of Transylvania was ordered to prepare feast on 
this occasion.195 It is easy to imagine that such celebrations would not only influence 
the local population, but rumors of might and power of the Ottoman armies could 
easily spread to the neighboring states, especially when esteemed guests from abroad 
were invited. In case of non-vassal, foreign states like Poland-Lithuania long letters 
were being sent in form of reports. In 1570, grand vizier Mehmed Paşa wrote such a 
report to Sigismund Augustus and informed the king about the successful war in 
Algeria and its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Paşa also 
mentioned conquest of ten castles on the Venetian border by vizier’s son and Ferhat 
Bey. Then the vizier gave details concerning the campaign in Cyprus, i.e. capture of 
the castle, and the exact number of killed and conquered enemies together with the 
estimated value of booty and prisoners (40 times 100,000 pieces of gold) and 
expected revenue, based upon newly produced tax registers (14 times 100,000 pieces 
of gold, but this number would rise when subject were not afraid of war anymore). 
The vizier finished his report hoping that he would write soon about successes of the 
Ottoman fleet under command of Piyale Paşa and Ali Paşa, who had followed the 
escaping enemy fleet.196 It is possible to guess that information revealed in such a 
letter had important psychological effect on readers. In other words, such letters 
were written in order to convince the addressee that treating the Ottomans in friendly 
terms was the most reasonable solution. 
The sources prove that the Ottoman State developed and used various 
intelligent means to promote the “propaganda of success” at home and abroad. The 
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addressees of such activities were either parts of the empire, including the vassal 
states or the states, which were vital for the Ottoman prosperous existence, like 
Poland-Lithuania. This feature became especially important after the death of 
Sigismund Augustus, when the Ottoman authorities tried, initially quite successfully, 
to secure election of such a candidate for the Polish-Lithuanian throne, who would 
guarantee maintaining the balance of power from the Ottoman perspective. 
Covenants, truces and peace agreements were most elaborated elements of 
diplomacy, but in everyday contacts smaller issues were by no means less important. 
Envoys and messengers traveled between Kraków and Istanbul or other imperial and 
royal cities as reflected in the mühimmes. Registers of fees, assigned by the crown 
treasury for provisions of envoys coming into Poland-Lithuania and going to foreign 
states preserved in the Central Archive of Old Documents in Warsaw, are another 
important source concerning practical sides of Ottoman-Polish diplomatic contacts. 
These documents give exact dates of embassies and the names of envoys. 
Comparative research with the use of mühimmes and the fees registers would allow 
specifying certain technical details (e.g. number of envoys, gifts offered) of 
embassies and personal information concerning the envoys and messengers. This, 
however, is outside the scope of this work. 
Mühimme records reveal major routes the embassies and messengers used in 
the sixteenth century. Major diplomatic route led through Wallachia and Moldavia 
and rulers of these principalities were responsible for safe passage of envoys and 
messengers going both sides. In practice, the sultans used to send orders first to all 
the kadis on the way towards border with Wallachia, although sometimes the orders 
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were directed to all the kadis on the way to Poland.197 Usually the orders specified 
number of people going with the envoy and their personal belongings, for example, 
two orders sent in 1578 to the voivode of Moldavia and kadis of Moldavia and 
Wallachia stated that certain Bucinski, Mulenski and Istorenski together with their 
seven servants should be provided with safe and free passage on their way home. 
These people brought to the sultan a brother of former Moldavian voivode who tried 
to hide in Poland from the sultan’s punishment.198 There are many similar items in 
almost all mühimme registers. Furthermore, people who knew Turkish and Polish 
were sometimes required to accompany the messengers.199 Accompanying the 
envoys was important from the security perspective, but it was also an easy and 
effective way of gaining some information or spying, hence the presence of 
interpreters was a good solution. Within the borders of Poland-Lithuania, foreign 
embassies and messengers were usually escorted by members of the royal court. 
Their function also included spying.200 
It is interesting to note that, the orders often included special regulations for 
the local commanders or kadis who were supposed to assist the messengers in 
various ways. Horses, guides and spies were provided for the sultan’s messengers 
sent to Poland.201 Sometimes kadis also provisioned messengers, as was the case for 
famous Joseph Nashi, a wealthy Jewish merchant, banker and favorite of sultan 
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Selim II.202 As far as the provisioning is concerned, from the moment of entering 
territory of Poland-Lithuania the embassies were hosted by king’s people who paid 
either from royal or public treasury.203 On the contrary, in the Ottoman Empire, only 
the sultan’s envoys of special importance, like the aforementioned Joseph Nashi, 
were provisioned and the Polish embassies had to pay for food.204 Apart from 
providing services, local commanders or rulers were also supposed to prepare 
reports on messengers. It seems that in cases of some importance it was easier to 
collect information concerning successes of missions through informal channels. 
Local commanders, having contacts on the other side of the border, could obtain 
information from private sources or they could just send their own people to see the 
development of affairs easily.205 Because the envoys and messengers spent a lot of 
time waiting for decisions of the addressee of their messages, or even for 
appointment of meeting, spies could fasten the flow of information. Such a solution 
was also useful in case the messenger was arrested, which must have happened from 
time to time206, although in general both sides tried to prevent it. 
Traditionally Polish embassies into the Ottoman state and Tatar khanates 
were bringing numerous gifts for the sultan and higher officials. In addition, gifts 
were offered to Ottoman and Tatar envoys that came into Poland. Sometimes, apart 
from provisioning, Tatar and Ottoman envoys into Poland-Lithuania were paid daily 
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stipend. For example, in 1551 the envoys of the Crimean and Kazan khans were 
provisioned for first sixteen days and then were paid stipends for almost two 
months.207 That particular embassy consisted of twenty-eight men and more than six 
hundred florens were spent daily on the stipends. In order to reduce the expenses, 
some of the Tatars were ordered to return after several weeks, but they would not 
obey. Then free provisions were no longer given and some of the Tatars decided to 
return home.208 
Although land route through Moldavia and Wallachia was used in diplomatic 
contacts most widely, it is possible to find proofs that other ways were also used. 
This could be connected with insecure internal situation in Moldavia or Wallachia, 
but one should not forget that missions included various tasks; it seems that 
sometimes they included also private enterprises. In 1572 two men of the Polish 
king, “Kılkış ve Severin” and their servants, wanted to sail to Alexandria, and from 
there to Jerusalem. The purpose of this visit is not mentioned, but one may assume 
that it was a pilgrimage. Receb, the bey of Alexandria, was ordered by the sultan to 
provide a boat and help them on their way.209 Then they were supposed to return by 
boat to Dubrovnik.210 Orders concerning right of free travel were needed, because 
the local officials in some places did not know how to deal with the foreign 
messengers. In 1588, the custom emin of Silistre seized property of a Polish envoy 
and taxed the money the envoy was carrying. This action was against the bilateral 
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practice, and therefore the sultan ordered the kadi of Silistre to return the tax to the 
envoy entirely.211 
This case proves in practical terms the existence of some prohibitions and 
privileges granted to the envoys. Apart from tax exemption on personal items, 
sometime the envoys could bring limited amounts of luxurious goods, which were 
normally subject to taxation or even prohibition. For example, an envoy returning 
from Girit into Poland in August 1565 was allowed to take with him a small boat 
loaded with wine. Relevant orders concerning this matter were sent to all the kadis 
on the sea route the envoy was to follow. 212 In other case, a brother of Polish envoy 
was allowed to bring timber by boats on the Dniester River and sell it after paying 
taxes.213 However, the authorities usually tried to prohibit the abuse of the 
regulations by envoys. The Ottoman authorities especially prohibited export of 
horses abroad. In one of the orders, it is stated clearly that a Polish envoy would be 
returning from Istanbul, via Kütahya (where he perhaps wanted to purchase some 
goods) into Moldavia and because it is prohibited to give good horses, i.e. warhorses 
to the infidels, the envoy should be given load horses he would ride himself.214 
Certainly, under pre-industrial conditions, warhorses were not only precious, but 
their number also predetermined the military power of states. In a similar order, the 
authorities determined the exact number of horses the envoy brought into the 
Ottoman Empire.215 On the other hand, in necessity the sultan’s envoys into Poland 
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were authorized to take good horses for their missions.216 In most cases, the orders 
did not specify which items were prohibited to be carried by envoys. Instead, the 
general phrase “memnu’ olmayan eşyasına müdahele edilmemek” was used.217 
Sometimes the envoys were supposed to fulfill complex missions, like 
escorting prisoners, looking for captives and slaves or obtain property of another 
envoy that had died on duty. New ‘ahidnâmes usually included articles concerning 
release of prisoners taken during campaigns. This was the theoretical side of the 
treaties. Practical realization was not easy and usually the sultan issued an order 
forcing release of the slaves and captives. The ones who had become Muslims were 
just freed whereas Christians were freed and sent back to Poland-Lithuania. Of 
course, the practical problem was finding the potential candidates for freeing. 
Therefore, the envoys traveled across the Ottoman state looking for captives assisted 
by the sultan’s order.218 If an envoy died abroad, another envoy was sent with a 
letter requesting assistance. When a janissary Mehmed died in Poland, his brother 
Hasan came with a letter to the king, in which the sultan asked the king to help 
Hasan find the property left by the late Ahmed.219 Things sometimes worked other 
way and instead of searching for captives, the envoys escorted prisoners. In the 
sixteenth century, the rebels, voivodes of Moldavia or Wallachia and their 
supporters, looked for shelter on the Polish side of the border. In such cases the 
sultan usually asked the king to catch the rebels, execute unimportant ones and send 
the important traitors (in some cases their heads were enough) to Istanbul in 
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chains.220 Similarly, people who did any harm to the envoys or messengers were also 
punished with great care.221 However not all cases were political; ordinary thieves, 
like certain servant of Hasan Bey, who stole his master’s money and fled,222 were 
also caught and punished. In a way, the sources reveal existence of an early form of 
diplomatic immunity and the practice of extradition between Poland-Lithuania and 
the Ottoman Empire. 
Although the envoys of both sides constituted the majority of travelers on the 
diplomatic route from Istanbul to Kraków, foreign envoys also used this way. In 
1583, two English envoys returned from Istanbul to England via Poland and orders 
concerning provisioning and security were sent to voivodes of Wallachia and 
Moldavia.223 According to Halil İnalcık, English merchants also used the transit 
route through Poland, especially during the reign of Stephen Bathory (1576-1586), 
thus avoiding problems with crossing France or territories under control of the 
Habsburgs.224 
Complex diplomatic procedures were not free of humorous or unusual 
events. In 1572, Selim II sent an envoy from Edirne to Sigismund Augustus. The 
sultan was informed that Laski, one of the Polish lords, gathered many soldiers near 
the Wallachian border. The sultan’s people did not know what the intension of the 
Polish lord was and therefore the sultan sent Turgut Çavuş to obtain news from the 
king. The sultan asked the king to assure Turgut Çavuş that the king would not act 
                                                 
220 e.g. AKW 69/205, AKW 70/246, AKW 70/249. 
221 MD VII, 103. 
222 AKW 70/237. 
223 MD LVIII 868. 
224 İnalcık, Halil.  An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. p. 369. 
 79 
against ancient friendship between the two states. Then the sultan added that if the 
gathering was caused by the fact that the Wallachian voivode was going to marry a 
bride from Poland, then the king should now that the sultan had not agreed on the 
crossing of the Wallachian border by the Polish troops and make harm in 
Wallachia.225 In other case, the sultan sent an order to certain Ahmed Çavuş asking 
whether the latter had given the sultanic letter to the Polish king. In case çavuş had 
not delivered the letter, the sultan wanted it back.226 Sometimes the skills of royal 
envoys were especially praised in letters to the kings.227 Some of the envoys 
demanded not only eulogies, but like in case of certain Süleyman Çavuş, they asked 
for material gratification for their services. Süleyman Çavuş who apparently worked 
as a spy for Polish chancellor Jan Zamoyski wrote a letter to the chancellor in 1598, 
stresseing his important role in preparation of the new ‘ahidnâme in addition to long 
and faithful service to Polish case. According to Süleyman Çavuş, nobody else but 
him understood Polish issues in Istanbul and the new treaty had been prepared 
despite unregulated Polish debts to the Ottomans. In the end, the çavuş complained 
that all the prices went up, which led to the conclusion that the chancellor should 
send him money by merchants. Süleyman must have worked for the chancellor for 
quite long time, because he wrote that he had obtained payment for three years and 
200 kuruş for one year were still to be paid (see appendix, document 1).228 
In Ottoman-Polish contacts, a vital role was played by people of Polish-
Lithuanian origin who in various ways became the Muslim subjects of the sultan. In 
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the sixteenth century, there were at least three such men – Zygmunt Laskowski, Jan 
Kierdej (Sait Bey), who was a Lithuanian, and Joachim Strasz (Ibrahim Bey). Jan 
Kierdej was born in 1490 as a son of starosta of Krasnystaw. After becoming the 
sultan’s servant, he was sent as an envoy into Poland-Lithuania in 1531, 1538 and 
1543.229 Much more is known about the last of the three. Strasz was most probably 
captured by Tatars and then sold to the Ottomans. His good knowledge of Polish 
implies that he must have been captured as a teenager rather, than a young child. In 
time, he became the sultan’s translator, replacing Yunus Bey at this office. First 
documents signed by Strasz appeared before 1551. It is usually easy to recognize his 
work, because he used to sign the documents as Ibrahim bej summus interpretes or 
Interpretes major majestatis suae invictissimae Imperatoris Thurcarum. During his 
service as the dragoman Ibrahim Bey used to travel to Venice, Frankfurt, Vienna, 
France and Poland. Although foreign envoys always called him “the Pole”, he 
remained loyal to the sultan. During the reign of Sigismund Augustus, Strasz was 
paid 100 pieces of gold by the king for supporting Jagiellonian (both Hungarian and 
Polish-Lithuanian) in Istanbul. It is important to stress that Strasz obtained this sum 
openly and was far from spying against the sultan. More likely, he was a kind of 
early lobbyist.230 Strasz died in safer 979 (July 1571).231 It is difficult to establish his 
influence on the policies of Suleyman and Selim II towards Poland-Lithuania, but it 
seems that he supported the idea of Polish-Hungarian-Ottoman alliance against the 
Habsburgs. 
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As far as Ibrahim Bey’s embassies to the Polish king are concerned, the 
archive in Warsaw contains several documents written by Strasz in Polish.232 Four of 
the documents were used in this study: one addressed to the king and three others 
written to the royal chancellor. The document for the king, presented to Sigismund 
Augustus in 1564, concerns mostly Wallachian issues and is discussed later in 
current chapter. Apart from this Strasz asked king’s assistance in getting debt that 
Erazm Haz, a merchant from Lwów, owed to Mustafa Çelebi.233 Another three 
documents, addressed for the chancellor are very interesting, because they reveal the 
mechanisms of obtaining references and influences in diplomatic ways. In the first 
letter, Ibrahim Bey simply greets the chancellor and assures him about his truthful 
service to the king and to the chancellor.234 Next, Strasz asks the chancellor to help 
him obtain written references from the king for a certain Musslij Aga (Müslih Ağa?), 
who would like to become a member of the sultan’s court, even the least important 
one. Strasz explains that the ağa was very helpful to the envoy of the voivode of 
Sandomierz, which should be mentioned in the reference. In the third letter a long 
list of people who ask for written references is given. This included: 
 
- Cafer, son of a former emin Arik Mehmed, who is already the 
beylerbey’s çavuş but would like to become the sultan’s çavuş and 
therefore he needs a reference. 
- Hüseyn of Polish and Christian origin, who has got a timar from the 
sultan in the sandjak of Könstendil. The size of the timar is 9290 
asper, and Hüseyn needs references in order to either become a 
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çavuş at the Porte or to obtain a bigger timar. The king should 
explain in the letter that Hüseyn used to be a king’s subject, which 
supposedly should help. Strasz adds that without such an 
explanation it would be difficult to obtain the office or timar. 
- Rizwan, another son of a Christian who is also of Polish origin. In 
this case a similar reference letter is necessary and the king should 
ask for a timar of several thousand asper, which, according to 
Strasz, was the standard size of a timar the sultan would grant. 
- Rüstem, also of Christian origin, who is Ibrahim’s personal servant. 
A similar recommendation letter is needed for him. 
- One Armenian who asks for change of a berat for the one bearing 
the name of the currant sultan. 
- Finally, Ibrahim asks for the payment of debts by the merchants of 
Lwów, according to their convenience, to the Ottoman merchants. 
He can authorize the debt letter with his own or the sultan’s 
signature.235 
 
As one may see, the list was quite detailed. At this point, a question concerning the 
importance of reference letters written to the sultan by the king arises. From the 
Ottoman perspective the sultan was superior to other rulers in Europe and therefore 
granted privileges unilaterally. What was seen as a prestigious act by the Ottomans, 
had a different meaning for the Europeans and led to development of capitulation 
rights, which in time became harmful for the Ottoman interests. It is logical to 
assume that also in case of reference letters it worked in similar way. If the king sent 
a petition to the sultan, the latter as superior to the king in Ottoman eyes would show 
his grace and superiority by granting the privilege. Hence, assuming that Sigismund 
Augustus had written the references, one could perhaps find names of people 
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mentioned by Ibrahim Bey in the ahkâm defters or the mühimmes containing timar 
nominations. Actually, it is possible to prove that the assumptions are quite realistic, 
because similar case is mentioned in Tarih-i Selânikî, where on a king’s request a 
sandjak was given to certain Mehmed Çavuş: 
 
Mürted Rıdvan başın getüren Mehmed çavuşa sancak virildüğidür. 
Ve bu esnâda Kara Mehmed Çavuş nâm kimseyle Mürted Rıdvan didükleri 
mel’ûnun başı Südde-i sa’âdete gönderilmiş kendüsi ibret-nümâ-yı âlem 
olmak-içün kazığa urulduğı arz olunup ve Kara Mehmed Çavuş’a Leh Kıralı 
sancak inâyet buyurulmak recâ eyledüği pâye-i serîr-i saltanate arz 
olundukda münâsib ise görülsün fermân olunmağla Silistre sancağı 
buyurulduğı sebt olundi. Fî evâsıt-ı şehr-i cumâdelûlâ, sene 1004.236 
 
 
This was written in 1004 (1596), when requests of Polish kings were treated not as 
seriously as they used to be during the reign of Sigismund Augustus. Therefore, one 
may assume that references sent by Sigismund had at least equal influence on 
Suleyman the Magnificent or Selim II. 
 Without doubt, practical functioning of diplomacy between the Ottoman 
Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth century is still 
full of neglected fields. Even the list of envoys sent by both sides available in works 
of Reychman and Unat are very imprecise and incomplete.237 The presented 
examples indicate that diplomacy was not only well developed, but also had its own 
specific rules and dealt with a broad spectrum of topics on different levels. The 
messengers were both representing interests of the state and influencing informal 
decisions, like in case of the references. Apart from this, the documents show the 
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existence of various informal channels. It is impossible to present all aspects of 
practical diplomacy in brief, but analysis of documents used in this study proves that 
the system worked generally quite well. The Ottomans treated Poland-Lithuania not 
as an equal state perhaps, but their attitude was friendly, or in case of difficulties, 
patient and tolerant. The sentence from Hürrem Sultan’s letter to Sigismund 
Augustus gives the very essence of how the sultans perceived the Jagiellonians: 
“Etmiş ki koca kıral bizim ile iki kardeş gibi idi İnşaallahurrahman bu kıral ile Ata 
ile oğul gibi olalım demiş.”238 On the other hands, Polish kings had to choose 
between the interest of the state and Christian loyalty, an aspect that was often 
stressed by the Habsburgs and the papacy. For the entire sixteenth century, the 
interest of the state prevailed and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was one of the 
first European states, which treated the Ottomans as difficult friends and partners 
rather than as the enemy that should be destroyed in the name of Christ. 
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II. Politics on the Borderland: Tatars, Cossacks and the Voivodes 
 
The inhabitants of borderland between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire 
were the major cause of trouble between the two states. Polish kings never gave up 
the idea of Moldavia being their vassal state; the same was the case for Wallachia. 
After the unsuccessful campaign of John Albert in the late fifteenth century, the 
Jagiellonian kings tried to follow the policy supporting the Ottoman rule in the 
region. When the Moldavian hospodar Alexander offered his vassal bond to 
Sigismund Augustus in 1552, the king refused.239 This strategy was followed by 
Bathory, who punished Ivan Podkova and Samuel Zborowski, who attacked 
Moldavia in 1579 and in 1583.240 After Bathory’s death, Polish policy towards 
Moldavia changed, mostly due to the ambitions of chancellor Zamoyski, who 
wanted to nominate his own candidate Movila to the Moldavian throne. In 1594 the 
Wallachian voivode Michael the Brave rebelled against the Ottomans and obtained 
support from both Moldavia and Transylvania. This led to Polish and Ottoman 
military intervention. The treaty was signed and Movila’s position was secured,241 
but the issue played an important role in future development of bilateral relations. 
This was just the beginning of Polish interventions into Moldavian and Wallachian 
issues. According to Selânikî, in the beginning of Cumâdelahire 1004 (February 
1596) the Polish king and the Crimean khan asked the sultan to nominate their 
candidate for the Wallachian throne, as he had done before with the Moldavian 
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voivode Movila. The suggestion was accepted by the sultan.242 Important economic 
and strategic position of Moldavia did not allow the Ottomans to abandon this 
principality, because the price was too high from their perspective. This was true 
especially in the second part of the sixteenth century when the Ottomans engaged in 
wars against the Habsburgs. According to Maxim Mihai, the Danubian Principalities 
at this time supported economically the Ottomans in three different ways: providing 
the trade monopoly inside the Ottoman system, paying provisions in goods, and 
collecting mandatory wholesale during wars.243 Consequently, the Moldavian and 
Wallachian issues sharply divided both states. As long as Polish kings respected the 
status quo, the Ottomans were satisfied, but the intervention of Zamoyski crushed 
the balance. Zamoyski had his plans concerning Moldavia already before the 
rebellion of Michael the Brave. His correspondence with the former voivode Aaron 
(ruled 1591-1592, 1592-1595) shows that Aaron was Zamoyski’s informer. The 
voivode wrote the chancellor about movements and number of Tatar forces. 
Moreover, in the letter dated 15 February 1595 Aaron asked Zamoyski for help, 
explaining that, “this land (i.e. Moldavia) is almost a wall between Turks and 
Christians”.244 
 Almost every document sent from the Ottoman sultans to the kings of 
Poland-Lithuania contains items concerning Wallachia, Moldavia, Cossacks and the 
Tatars. The content is similar in general. Former voivodes used to escape to Poland-
Lithuania, taking their property, and sometimes families or army with them. Then 
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the Porte tried to convince the king to capture the runaways and sent them back to 
Istanbul. This pattern does not change, but it is not striking when one considers the 
number of voivodes in the sixteenth century. There were twenty-six changes on the 
Moldavian throne and thirty-six on the Wallachian. Some of the voivodes ruled 
several times, often only for a couple of months.245 According to Gelibolulu Mustafa 
Âlî, rebellions caused by heavy taxes were major reasons of such a short rule of the 
voivodes.246 Together with the frequency the Danubian issues were mentioned in the 
sultan’s letters, this suggests that the situation in the two vassal states was extremely 
unstable. 
 The Cossacks were another important element of the Polish-Ottoman border. 
Theoretically speaking they were the subjects of Polish kings but in fact, the 
Cossacks were outlaws, who did not obey any rules. They inhabited the most remote 
areas on the southeastern border of the Commonwealth and made their living by 
pillaging the neighborhood. It is therefore not coincidence that, like the Danubian 
issues, the attacks of Cossacks were common part of almost every sultanic letter for 
the Polish king since the early Jagiellonian period.247 In the second half of the 
sixteenth century, the Cossacks became very active in raiding not only the Crimean 
khanate and the Danubian principalities, but also the Ottoman mainland. For 
example in 1589, they crossed the Black Sea and plundered several Ottoman towns. 
Similarly, in 1614 they pillaged Trabzon, Sinope and even wanted to pillage 
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Istanbul.248 Bathory tried to regulate the Cossack question during his reign, and 
incorporate them into regular army of the Commonwealth. This attempt was only 
partially successful, because limited financial resources enabled Bathory to register 
only 600 Cossacks and the majority was still out of control.249 Later kings were also 
unable to solve the growing Cossack problem. The Cossacks in time turned against 
the king and in the winter of 1647-48, the great Cossack uprising was launched by 
Bohdan Chmielnicki. In 1654 Chmielnicki swore loyalty to the tsar, which only 
deepened the problem.250 The Porte started losing its patience much earlier, but the 
sultans did not want to recognize the fact that the Polish kings had virtually no 
control over the Cossacks. Finally a bloody battle between the Ottoman and Polish-
Lithuanian armies took place in 1620, after the Ottomans signed peace treaty with 
Persia. The sultan warned a royal envoy that his patience had run out and he would 
fight the Cossacks. Strangely enough, the war was started by the royal forces that 
entered Moldavia.251 Therefore, two major reasons of the war were the Cossacks and 
Moldavia. The problem of Cossacks was thoroughly researched by Victor 
Ostapchuk in “Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman 
Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639)”. Ostapchuk focuses on 
practical aspects of the Ottoman defense system introduced gradually by the Porte 
against the Cossack attacks. Ostapchuk stresses the growing role of the Cossack 
problem in Ottoman-Polish contacts and the use of threats by the Ottoman 
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authorities in their diplomatic correspondence with the Commonwealth.252 This idea 
fits to the content of the archival material – almost in each sultanic letter addressed 
to the Polish king, there is a passage where the sultan asks the king to punish the 
Cossacks, because their attacks are against the treaties. 
 The last important element of the Ottoman-Polish relations was the Crimean 
Khanate. Similar to the Cossack who attacked areas under the Ottoman protection; 
the Tatars often raided Poland-Lithuanian lands. In practical terms, there no 
difference the two, but from the political perspective the major difference was the 
fact that the Ottoman sultans treated Cossacks as subjects of the Polish kings, 
whereas the Tatars were treated as a separate political entity. Therefore, whenever 
the Polish side complained on the Tatar raids to the sultan, the answer was usually 
polite, but not very helpful. In the nâme written for Sigismund Augustus as a 
response to the king’s complaints on the raids, Selim II wrote that the khan was, as a 
Muslim, protected by the sultan. Moreover, the khan was a sovereign and ruled his 
own country, although he “kept the sultan’s flag“ for a long time. Therefore, the 
king was advised to write directly to the khan. In the same document Selim stressed 
that the tribute to the khan should be always paid on time and that the king should 
punish the Cossacks who raided the Tatar’s land.253 The preferential treatment was 
sometimes used by the khans, who tried to influence the Porte, Poland-Lithuania and 
the Muscovites. In case of Poland-Lithuania, the Tatars often cooperated with the 
Jagiellonians in wars against the Muscovites. In 1540, Poland-Lithuania allied with 
the Crimean Tatars in return for annual gifts for the khan. The gift was linen cloth 
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worth 15,000 pieces of gold. In 1542, the alliance was renewed. Despite close 
temporary cooperation, the Tatars often raided Poland breaking the treaties. There 
were small incursions in 1533, 1534, 1538 and 1541 and a big one in 1546. Due to 
the Habsburg intrigues, Suleyman the Magnificent ordered Sahib Giray to attack 
Poland-Lithuania in 1549. Another action took place in 1551 when Devlet Giray 
destroyed the city of Braclaw. This action was also provoked by the Habsburgs who 
tried to start the Polish-Ottoman war in order to weaken the Ottoman positions in 
Hungary. However, a year later the treaty was signed with the Crimea.254 Despite the 
treaty, the independent raids of small independent Tatar groups still occurred from 
time to time. In some cases, they were provoked by late payment of tribute for the 
khan.255 The tribute was high and constituted important position in the Crimean 
budget, therefore late payment created economic problem for the khanate. Only 
during the reign of Sigismund the Old and Sigismund Augustus that is in the period 
1506-1572, Poland-Lithuania sent to the khan eleven installments of tribute, each 
one was worth 400,000 pieces of gold. The annual average was then 6,000 pieces of 
gold.256 
 With the end of the Jagiellonian dynasty in 1572, the sultans started using the 
Tatars to influence the elections in Poland, which has already been discussed in the 
earlier chapters. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the second half of the 
sixteenth century was the time when the Crimean Khanate started losing the position 
of regional power. The khans still influenced the development of policies – collapse 
of the Astrakhan campaign conducted by the Ottomans is a good example of such 
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influence257 – and tried to carry on independent policies, but military successes of 
the Muscovites and Poland-Lithuania, together with the rise of the Cossack problem 
limited the power of the Crimean Khanate. In addition, the Ottomans did not want to 
tolerate such failures as the Astrakhan campaign and started appointing the khans 
themselves.258 
 All geopolitical factors discussed above heavily influenced development and 
quality of the Ottoman-Polish relations at the end of the sixteenth century. Under 
such conditions, despite the efforts made by the Ottomans and, to some extend, 
Sigismund III Vasa it was impossible to keep the balance of power in the region. 
Without solving the unsolvable problem of Tatars, Cossacks and the Danubian 
principalities the relations gradually deteriorated and resulted in series of wars in the 
seventeenth century. 
                                                 
257 İnalcık.  “Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin”. 
258 Türk, Ahmet.  “The Crimean Khanate”, pp. 107-14. 
 92 
 
III. A World Beyond Borders: Economy and Trade 
 
Since the very beginning trade and other economic activities played an important 
role in Ottoman-Polish relations. Already in 14th century, merchants of Lwów259 
traded with Caffa, Cyprus and Constantinople. After the conquest of Constantinople 
by sultan Mehmed II in 1453, the merchants of Lwów developed trade extensively, 
because with the Ottoman blockade of the Bosphorus, the Genoese merchants who 
wanted to continue trade had to use the land route from Crimea, through Akkerman 
and Lwów into Italy. For the entire period of the Ottoman war with Venice (1463-
1475), the Lwów trade developed rapidly and the Genoese decided to become 
vassals of the Polish king in 1462.260 The Dutch also used transit road via Lwów for 
their trade with the Ottomans since the fifteenth century.261 Development of 
economic activities on that route was determined by situation in the Danubian 
Principalities. That is why keeping control over Moldavia and Wallachia was 
important not only for Poland-Lithuania and the Ottomans, but also for the kingdom 
of Hungary. These regions constituted the key to economic and political control of 
the whole region.262 In 1454, the Moldavian voivode Aaron III accepted the Ottoman 
suzerainty and two years later the sultan granted privileges of free trade in Edirne, 
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Bursa and Istanbul to the Moldavian merchants.263 The Ottoman conquest of Caffa 
in 1475, and Kilia with Akkerman a couple of years later, affected the development 
of trade with Poland-Lithuania, but the sultan already in1484 imposed very attractive 
low taxes (3.3%) on the merchants of Lwów, and in 1489 he tried to attract these 
very merchants to trade with the Ottomans.264 In the ‘ahidnâme granted by Bayezid 
II in 1494 to the Polish king, free access by sea and land together with the protection 
of the life and property of merchants were included.265 Then set of economic 
privileges included in ‘ahidnâmes developed gradually and constantly.266 Because 
road from Lwów into Caffa and Akkerman led through Moldavia, in 1498 John 
Albert attempted unsuccessfully to re-establish Polish control over that principality, 
which led to the temporary breakdown of the Ottoman trade with Lwów.267 This last 
military effort of the Jagiellonians against the Ottomans did not have ongoing 
effects, because Kilia was an important wine export outpost already in 1505. The 
wine was exported from the Mediterranean region into Poland-Lithuania and 
Muscovy.268 Merchants of Poland-Lithuania were granted concessions from the 
Ottoman sultans as one of the first states, and the Ottoman-Polish trade flourished 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
 In the second half of the sixteenth century, and especially during Stephan 
Bathory’s reign (1576-1586) the English used Poland as a transit country in trade.269 
At first, the English tried to trade directly with Persia using the Muscovite port of 
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Archangelsk on the White Sea, because the ports on the Baltic Sea were blocked by 
Polish and Swedish armies. Bathory’s reign facilitated English trade, especially 
when the king tried to break the resistance of the port city of Danzig, by granting 
trade privileges to the competitive port in Elbląg. Similarly, the English also 
obtained first Ottoman capitulations in 1579 and in 1581 “The Turkey Company” 
was established. The English wanted to use the trade route from Danzig or Elbląg 
via Lwów, Black Sea, and Anatolia to Persia.270 
 The scale of Ottoman-Polish trade in the sixteenth century must have been 
quite impressive. According to Halil İnalcık, in mid-seventeenth century, i.e. the 
time of constant wars and troubles in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, one 
caravan of merchants was coming from Poland to Istanbul every month, in 
comparison to six-ten caravans a year from Persia, two a year from Basra, three to 
four from Aleppo, one from Ragusa, and one every eight days from Izmir.271 It is 
reasonable therefore, to assume that in the sixteenth century, i.e. the period of 
friendly and intensive relations between the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania 
the trade must have been much more active. However, only limited data has been 
proposed this period so far. The numbers provided by İnalcık do not include 
maritime travel while, in fact, merchants traveled from Lwów to Istanbul both by 
land and combined sea-land route. In the first case, the journey lasted for forty days 
and in the latter, the travel was much shorter and took only twenty-five days.272 
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 The merchants of Lwów imported from the Ottoman Empire mostly wine, 
hides, cattle, fish, salt273, textiles (tiftik, çamlet, yağmurluk, boğasi, Musul bezi, 
alaca, çit, silk, cotton and Angora wool – the last one illegally as it belonged to 
prohibited goods), carpets, kilims, pelts, garments, belts, leather shoes, leather 
products, furs (of tigers and Persian leopards), arms and armors (illegally), pottery, 
soap, pipes, tents, spices, fruit juices, precious stones, pearls, dyes, and horses.274 
The last item seems controversial, because as already mentioned in the previous 
chapter and will be dealt with below, horses were among items strictly prohibited by 
the authorities to be exported outside the Empire. On the other hand, Dziubiński 
stresses that there existed specialized horse trade agents in the Empire, who used to 
export quality horses into Poland-Lithuania.275 
 The Ottoman imports from the Commonwealth were not so impressive. Halil 
İnalcık mentions woolen cloth of English origin276, whereas Dziubiński claims that 
most important item was linen, especially Lithuanian brand. Apart from this, a large 
quantity of iron items (knives, wires) and metals, especially tin (illegally), which 
was used in the production of cannons were imported. A sub branch of metal 
imports included various mechanical and sun clocks, some of them produced in the 
West and some by local manufactories. The third most important imported goods 
were furs of Muscovy and Lithuanian origin. In addition, wax, ambers and printed 
books in Hebrew constituted most important items of Polish-Lithuanian trade offer. 
The books were mostly Talmudic comments printed in Kraków and Lublin, but 
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books of official Polish custom and tax regulations were also popular among the 
Jewish merchants in Istanbul, who wanted to facilitate their business.277 
 Well-developed trade relations led to many practical problems, which are 
reflected in primary sources of that period. The sources deal with six major 
categories of cases: various assistance in preparation of journeys and tax exemption 
for merchants working directly for the sultan or king, problems of robbery on the 
roads, merchants’ debts, orders concerning smuggling of prohibited goods, problems 
caused by natural deaths of merchants abroad and items concerning animals. The 
last category is not directly connected with trade, but still can be treated as an 
economic activity, because it concerns trade and grazing of animals between the two 
states. 
 Most space in the sources is devoted to tax exemptions and assistance to 
merchants during their journeys. Tax exemption was only applied in such cases 
when the trade was conducted directly in the name of the ruler i.e. the sultan or the 
king; hence the goods traded in that category were rather luxurious. For example, in 
1588 the sultan wrote a nâme to the king, informing him that two imperial 
merchants, Mehmed and Halil, would go to Moscow to purchase furs and some 
other items. The sultan asked the king not to impose any taxes on the merchants on 
their way there and back.278 Import of furs by the court in Istanbul was connected 
with annual nomination of higher officials by the sultan during festivities or 
bayrams. On that occasion, the sultan used to present official garments, lined with 
furs, to the newly appointed officials. Then the officials would present other fur-
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lined garments to people who helped them in obtaining the appointment. Hence, the 
court was in constant need of furs. In case of closing the Lithuanian frontiers with 
Muscovy due to war, which resulted in limitation of fur exports from Poland-
Lithuania, situation on the Ottoman court was becoming unstable, because the 
traditional ceremonies could not be observed.279 In such context it is easy to 
understand that the Ottoman authorities treated the fur trade seriously and why 
requests concerning free passage and tax exemption for fur merchants were sent not 
only to Polish kings, but also to the khan, to voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia, to 
all the kadis in places the merchants were passing and sometimes even to the rulers 
of Muscovy. For example, six orders in the mühimme register dated 25 Mart 1566 
were connected with Mehmed, the sultan’s merchant who was heading to Muscovy 
with the intention of buying furs.280 There was an order prepared for each stage of 
merchant’s journey, and all orders included the same request: to assist and protect 
Mehmed, and to exempt his money and furs from taxes. This method of protecting 
fur merchants was not exceptional. In 1585, similar orders were prepared for 
Dimitri, another fur merchant going to Muscovy.281 
It seems that the sultan’s assistance was even more developed, because it is 
possible to find orders in which the Polish king, the Moldavian and the Wallachian 
voivodes were asked to help the imperial merchant Mahmud bring back 114 samur 
furs he had deposited in Poland.282 Royal merchants purchasing goods for the king in 
the Empire were also exempted from custom dues, but not entirely. According to 
                                                 
279 Dziubiński.  Na szlakach Orientu, pp. 89. 
280 MD V 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316. 
281 MD LVIII 506, 507, 508. For the full text see appendix III. 
282 MD LVIII, 306, 437. 
 98 
sultan’s order, custom dues were not taken for goods up to the value of 4,000 
florens.283 It seems that this was not a solution against the king, but rather action 
against fraud and abuse because the order stresses that customs officers should check 
whether goods were really for the king. 
Another limitation concerned the prohibited goods. Polish kings prohibited 
selling tin to the Ottomans, who needed it for military purposes. Since 1523, there 
existed formal prohibition of tin export, which was renewed by Sigismund Augustus 
and Stephan Bathory. Nevertheless, the scale of smuggle must have been impressive, 
because there were sultan’s agents looking for tin and despite the prohibition only in 
1566 the authorities confiscated three tons of tin certain Mustafa Çelebi was trying 
to take out of Poland.284 Among the goods prohibited for export into Poland-
Lithuania were horses, cattle and wax candles. Despite the prohibitions there must 
have existed a developed smuggle and black market, because in 1587 the sultan 
repeated his orders prohibiting selling horses and cattle to the Poles and 
Hungarians.285 Similar order, including also wax candles, was repeated a couple of 
months later and this time the sultan demanded heavy punishment for the 
smugglers.286 
 Existence of orders requiring good treatment of merchants suggests that 
various obstacles awaited the merchants every now and then. Despite the fact that 
articles of ‘ahidnâmes specified rights and privileges of merchants, local authorities 
did not always follow the law and the sultan had to issue special orders for kadis: 
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vusûl buldukda, ahid-nâme-i hümâyûnumda mukayyed olan husûslardan 
eger tüccâr ahvâlidür; mer’î tutup ana mugâyir kimesneye iş itdürmeyesiz ve 
gelüp giden bâzergânların ahde mugâyir rencîde itdürmeyüp itmek 
isteyenleri sekidüp inâd eyleyenleri atebe-i ulyâma yazup bildüresiz. Şöyle 
ki; ahde mugâyir iş ola, sizden bilinür; ana göre basîret üzre olasız.287 
 
Of course, the sultan’s subjects faced similar problems in Poland-Lithuania and the 
king had to punish abuses and mistreatments. Problem of personal and professional 
freedom of merchants was universal at that time and involvement in economic 
activities, although profitable, was quite risky. Consequently, the authorities tried to 
protect merchants not only in legal, but also in practical way, i.e. by asking for or 
supplying military guards.288 Despite all the precautions, robbery and other forms of 
violence, including murders of merchants, were not uncommon. Sixteenth century 
Poland-Lithuania was not a safe place and the situation became even worse during 
lengthy interregnum periods in the second half of the century. In 1534, a whole 
caravan of Ottoman merchants, 18 persons, were robbed and killed near Kamieniec 
Podolski and in 1543 Mirzali, a merchant from Bursa was robbed and murdered by a 
hired coachman. Similar event took place in 1549 when Şeref ed-Din, a merchant 
from Aleppo, was also killed by a coachman. All these cases are known, because the 
sultan intervened but in most cases, there were no witnesses and the murders 
remained unidentified. 
Lack of safe routes was additionally influenced by development of political 
events. Apart from the aforementioned interregnum periods, the second part of the 
sixteenth century was a time of internal troubles in Moldavia, which made transit 
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through this principality very dangerous. Moreover, celali rebellions, which began in 
the late sixteenth century in Anatolian provinces of the Empire, also influenced 
merchants trading with Ankara, Bursa, Tokat, Sivas and Erzurum.289 Sometimes the 
roads could be extremely unsafe. In 1570, some Ottoman merchants going to 
Moscow had to buy their freedom three times on their way with animals and goods 
worth 70,000 pieces of gold in total.290 Three years later 400 Polish soldiers raided 
Akkerman and murdered Crimean merchants, capturing 700 pieces of cattle. Then 
they killed some soldiers sent by the bey of Akkerman to stop them.291 
 Property of merchants who died abroad was subject to protection of the 
authorities. Regulations concerning this matter were included in the ‘ahidnâmes 
already in 1494.292 To obtain the property of the deceased, one had to come “cum 
literis regalibus”, i.e. with royal letters. Respectively, to inherit the property of a 
merchant who died in Poland-Lithuania one needed imperial letters. These were 
written in a form of nâme for the king. A good example of such document is a nâme 
in the mühimme register concerning the property of Hızır bin Sefer Şah from Tokat 
who died in Lwów in 1574. The sultan asks the king to help get Hızır’s property 
back and to return it to Esar and Murad veledi Segis who would come to get it.293 
Another example is a nâme for the king concerning 500 macar altun and some 
property left by the late Jew Yakup at the deposit of another Jew Musa. It is 
explained in the order that Yakup was a stepfather of Seleme, who initially was to 
inherit the property with several other persons, but turned out to be the only 
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inheritor. The sultan informs the king that the property will be collected by Seleme’s 
son-in-law.294 It seems that the solution was functional. More problems appeared in 
the case of unpaid debts. The sultan’s envoy Ibrahim Bey mentioned during his 
speech to Sigismund Augustus debts of some merchants from Lwów who despite 
several requests sent by the sultan did not pay.295 Due to the sultan’s intervention, 
this and other similar cases were solved in court with an interesting outcome. 
Because the debts were high and the debtor bankrupted, the court in several cases 
judged cession of residence ownership and the Ottoman merchants were given 
tenement houses in Lwów and other cities. In 1579 Hüseyin, a merchant from 
Ankara obtained ownership of a tenement house in Kamieniec Podolski.296 It is 
likely that the analysis of sicill registers from Ankara, Bursa, Trabzon and Istanbul 
might reveal similar cases in the Ottoman Empire. 
 Last important category of Ottoman-Polish economic activities concerned 
pasturing and grazing of animals as well as their trade. Usually shepherds of the 
Ottoman borderland were crossing the frontier to pasture sheep on the Polish side. In 
the ‘ahidnâme granted by Suleyman to Sigismund Augustus in 1553 this question 
was presented in the following way: ... çoban taifesi Leh vilayetine geçdiklerinde 
memleket hakimlerine kendülerin ve koyunların bildirüb mahfi varmayalar ve otlak 
hakkı vireler çoban taifesi kendülerin bildirdiklerinden sonra koyunı zayi’ olursa 
memleket hâkiminden talep eyleye.297 This passage was included in almost identical 
form into following ‘ahidnâmes. According to the theory, sheep should have been 
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registered and the shepherds should have paid pasture taxes. In practice, on the other 
hand, the situation was much more complicated, because several complaints of the 
Polish king can be traced in the documents. In 1564, the sultan answered the king’s 
complaint, stating that the shepherds should give the number of their sheep to 
officials on both sides of the frontier and sheep pastured on Polish side should be 
taxed by the royal officials, but the sultan’s officials should be also present in order 
to prevent losses of any side.298 The same problem reappeared in the answer to 
king’s complaint sent by sultan Selim in 1571,299 and in the sultan’s order to the bey 
of Akkerman.300 One may find other additional material concerning this topic in the 
mühimmes. In another order to the bey of Akkerman the sultan stressed that some 
people who crossed the border and used pastures on the king’s side should pay otlak 
resmi to the king and if they went for trade, they should also pay baç and gümrük 
resmi.301 The same sultanic orders were repeated in a nâme to the king.302 
This suggests that the shepherds did try to escape paying taxes and despite 
the combined efforts of both sides, it was difficult to control not only the shepherds, 
but also other people who crossed the frontier. Sometimes the officials followed the 
rules too strictly and the sultan had to issue orders preventing merchants coming 
from Poland-Lithuania from high taxes and custom fees and from confiscation of 
animals.303 As a conclusion, it seems worth presenting an interesting episode 
concerning sheep trade during the reign of Bathory. Apparently at that time sheep 
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from Poland-Lithuania were sold to Istanbul and speculative market must have 
arisen, because in the nâme for Bathory written in mühimme (1577), the sultan asked 
the king to sell the sheep for export from Poland to Istanbul only to those butchers 
who had obtained a license from the sultan.304 
 Economic activities between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman states in the 
sixteenth century were one of the most important links between the two states. One 
might suppose that peaceful relations maintained so successfully at that time were 
stimulated by pressures of merchants and market demands on both sides. This 
hypothesis could and perhaps should be validated in a study focusing strictly on 
influences of economic relations on Ottoman and Polish-Lithuanian state policies. 
Limited scope of this work does not allow such a comprehensive analysis. 
Moreover, the spectrum of topics concerning Ottoman-Polish trade is much wider 
than the key elements presented above. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Ottoman-Polish relations in the sixteenth century developed in two different phases. 
During the reigns of the Polish-Lithuanian kings Sigismund the Old (1506-1548) 
and Sigismund Augustus (1548-1572), and the Ottoman Sultans Suleyman the 
Magnificent (1520-1566) and Selim II (1566-1574), both states cooperated when 
confronted by common enemies: the Habsburgs and the Muscovites. The amicable 
relations that they enjoyed at that time were the result of the absence of serious 
problems. Minor issues like the Tatar and Cossack raids or the internal tensions in 
Moldavia and Wallachia were generally solved by cooperation. In addition, they 
came up with a common Transylvanian policy against the Habsburgs. Such a 
solution was profitable for the Jagiellonians, who had historical and dynastical 
claims to Hungary, and the Ottomans, who wanted a predictable partner in their 
conflicts with the Habsburgs. The Jagiellonians received the first eternal ‘ahidnâmes 
from the Ottomans and obtained the truce from şehzâde Selim, unprecedented acts in 
relations of the Ottomans with the European states. These gestures show clearly that 
the Jagiellonians and the Ottomans treated one another in very friendly and serious 
manner. In their relations with another common enemy, Muscovy, the Ottomans 
tried to obtain an alliance with Sigismund Augustus but did not succeed, mainly due 
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to policy of the Crimean khan. Devlet Giray feared that common action against 
Muscovy would destroy the beneficial balance of power between Muscovy, Poland-
Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. The khan was aware that as long as all these 
three powers existed, he would be able to enjoy extensive autonomy from the 
Ottomans. 
 When the Jagiellonian dynasty ceased ruling Poland-Lithuania on 7 July 
1572, the Ottomans faced the necessity of reshaping policy towards their kingless 
neighbor in the north. Although the Jagiellonians used to be rather predictable 
partners for the sultans, the “ancient” friendship between the house of Osman and 
the house of Jogaila lost its importance on the eve of elections to the Polish throne. 
Changing their policy towards Poland-Lithuania, the Ottomans influence the election 
so that a candidate who would be friendly towards the Porte and would not destroy 
the delicate balance of power in the region would come to the throne. In the light of 
the analyzed sources, it seems reasonable to support the idea that the Ottomans did 
have crucial influence, even just indirect, on the result of the elections of Henry de 
Valois, Stephan Bathory and Sigismund III Vasa. When the first elected king 
returned to France due to unexpected death of his brother, the grand vizier Sokollu 
Mehmed Paşa decided to use the experience he had acquired during the first election 
in order to secure the election of Stephan Bathory. Relevant items in mühimme 
registers prove that the vizier took all precaution in case a hostile candidate would be 
chosen. In other words, the Ottomans would use all possible means, including 
military intervention, in order to prevent election of the Habsburg or Muscovite 
candidate. 
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 Bathory’s reign was a time of complicated yet peaceful relations with the 
Porte. The Cossacks and the Tatars influenced the Ottoman attitude towards Poland-
Lithuania. Bathory on the other hand appears to have done his best to satisfy the 
sultan abstaining from engaging in anti-Ottoman policies as some historians 
suggested. It is equally apparent that he was not a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. 
Bathory was aware of the Ottoman power and did not see a better ally against the 
Habsburgs. Therefore, his loyal support of the Ottomans was the only sensible 
option in order to maintain acceptable relations with the Habsburgs in Transylvania 
and with the Muscovites on the eastern border. Bathory’s premature death in 1586 
brought end to the policy of close Ottoman-Polish cooperation. Since the first 
symptoms of future problems, i.e. growth of military activities of the Cossacks were 
seen during Bathory’s reign, this period in the Ottoman-Polish relations can be 
treated as transitional. 
 The Porte was busy with Persian and Georgian campaigns and therefore 
could not engage as actively into the third election as it did into the previous ones. 
Nevertheless, the sultan clearly declared once again that the election of an Ottoman 
enemy would be regarded as the casus belli. The orders sent to borderlands and the 
Tatars proved that the sultan’s words were gravely serious. Election of Vasa at first 
was seen as a good solution for the Ottoman-Polish relations. Involvement of the 
king in succession to the Swedish throne and Moldavian ambitions of the chancellor 
Zamoyski in addition to the outbreak of civil, and then Habsburg-Ottoman war in 
Transylvania led to resumption of hostilities. The relations were tense but there was 
still a chance of positive solution. Further development of the Cossack problem led 
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to Ottoman preparation for war. In this case, both states were not flexible enough: 
the Ottomans did not want to treat the Cossacks as uncontrollable rebels, but 
preferred to accuse the Polish king of lacking good will to tame them. On the other 
hand, when the Ottomans started a campaign against the Cossacks, the 
Commonwealth responded with anger instead of cooperation with the Ottomans 
against the common threat. In addition, the role of the Tatars in that time was 
crucial. The sultans tended to favor the Tatars, which influenced negatively the 
Polish-Lithuanian attitude against the Ottomans. In fact, the Commonwealth 
suffered from Tatar raids in a similar way the Ottomans were faced by incursions of 
the Cossacks. 
 During the entire sixteenth century, trade seems to have played a very 
important role in the relations between the Porte and the Commonwealth. The transit 
route from Istanbul to Lwów was central to economic activities of both states. 
Moreover, the itinerary via Poland was used as a trade route linking the Ottoman 
Empire with Western Europe. This supports the idea that keeping trade routes 
accessible had essential importance for the Ottomans. 
 This work focuses on various aspects of Ottoman-Polish relations throughout 
the sixteenth century and is based upon relevant primary sources. The results of 
analysis prove that not only were the Ottoman-Polish relations very vivid at that 
time, but the character of bilateral contacts also changed gradually. The changes 
were unavoidable, because from the Ottoman perspective preventing the balance of 
power in the region was the most important issue. Significant changes in political 
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relations apparently did not influence economic activities. Definitely further studies 
of the topic are necessary, because the existing picture is still incomplete. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
1. Ottoman Sultans and Polish Kings in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: 
 
 
 
Bayezid I 1389-1402 Louis of Anjou 1370-1382 
Mehmed I 1413-1421 Jadwiga 1384-1399 
Murad II 1421-1451 Ladislaus Jagiełło 1387-1434 
Mehmed II 1444 and 1451-1481 Ladislaus III 1434-1444 
Bayezid II 1481-1512 Casimir 1447-1492 
Selim I 1512-1520 John Albert 1492-1501 
Suleyman I 1520-1566 Alexander 1501-1506 
Selim II 1566-1574 Sigismund I 1506-1548 
Murad III 1574-1595 Sigismund Augustus 1548-1572 
Mehmed III 1595-1603 Henry de Valois 1573-1574 
  Stephan Bathory 1576-1586 
  Sigismund III Vasa 1587-1632 
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2. A map of Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
second half of the 16th century. 
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3. AKW 70/233 part 1. 
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4. AKW 70/233 part 2. 
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5. AKW 70/233 – English translation of the Polish document: 
 
 
I offer my Services to My Gracious Lord 
 
Concerning motives of the [recommendation] letters, I asked His Majesty, for [support for] 
some of my [men], which is to be written by His Majesty to My Master, it should be as 
follows: 
 
The name: Cafer, son of certain Arik Mehmet, who used to be the emin at the Danube River 
and was great and renowned and famous in our state but already died. And [his son] is here 
with me and was before and he is also your servant, your Lordship. But, if I am to help him 
further, there is no need to mention his father’s presence here with me in the letter, but [it 
should be written] that he is here, in agreement and friendship his father was supposed to 
have here with the subjects and some lords of His Majesty, after some business of his father. 
And because he was here when I came, he asked in his good manner etc. And especially, 
being already the çavuş of the beylerbey, with the help of His Highness he wants to obtain 
the position of çavuş of our Emperor. And thus, he asks for the letter. 
 
And there is another one, a certain Hüseyin, though a son of a Christian, who holds on 
behalf of His Imperial Majesty a timar of 9290 asper in the sancak of Kostendil. He also 
asks that he could, by the recommendation of His Royal Majesty, become a çavuş at the 
court of His Imperial Majesty or that he could get a better timar. And there should be such a 
reason in the king’s letter that Hüseyin was a subject of the Polish crown by birth, because 
without some reason it would be difficult or impossible to obtain [what he wants]. 
 
In addition, I ask for such a letter, written in the same manner like the previous one, for 
another [man], whose own name is Rizvani (?). He is also a son of Christian and a Pole by 
birth and he asked me to gain, with help of the recommendation letter from his Highness, 
several thousands [asper] of a timar, according to tradition followed by His Imperial 
Highness. 
 
And the third or fourth [recommendation letter], in the same manner, [should be] for my 
own servant, who is here with me now. Because he is also a Muslim and his name is 
Rüştem. He is son of a Christian, too. 
 
And one Armenian from Kamieniec [Podolski] asked me to obtain the renewal of his letter 
(i.e. berat) in the same manner, [i.e. with the recommendation from the king], for the one 
with the name of our currant Emperor. 
 
And also concerning debts the merchants of Lwów should pay to the Emperor’s merchant, 
they can pay according to their convenience and I will acknowledge receipt with my own or 
the Emperor’s name. And one of them already .... and he asked me for such a letter that he 
could pay nobody else [but the sultan’s merchant]. In six months he could pay off the 
Emperor’s merchant. 
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6. AKW 71/279. 
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7. AKW 70/232 
8. AKW 70/232. English translation of the Polish document. 
 
Your Gracious Lordship 
My dearest grateful friend. I offer my services to your Lordship etc. 
Some of my friends asked me for favor for a certain Müsliy Aga. Could you help me 
obtain a recommendation letter from His Majesty to His Imperial Highness 
mentioning this Aga, who would like to become even the least important member of 
His Imperial Majesty’s court? If your Lordship could do me a favor, it would be 
good to obtain such a letter from His Highness. And in the letter, it should be 
mentioned that the voivode of Sandomierz during his visits at His Imperial Highness 
was helped by the Aga and he already recommended the Aga [to the sultan] and 
[such an office at the court] was promised to him. 
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9. MD XXIX: 151 
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10. MD LVIII: 506, 507, 508
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11. MD LXII: 423. 
 
 
